To date, most research on compensation systems in agency relationships has focused primarily on moral hazard problems related to agents' effort, and has been limited to the compensation systems of top executives that can incentivize the desired level of effort sought by the firm. This study extends the scope of research by applying agency relationships to the taxi industry, examining the moral hazard problem related to drivers' reporting of fare revenue, and analyzing the optimal revenue reporting level and optimal effort level of agents under various compensation systems (fixed salary, performance-based pay, leasing system, owner-operator system, etc.) depending on whether a total fare revenue management system is implemented. The main findings of this study are as follows. First, when total fare revenue management is not implemented, there is no distortion in drivers' effort input in all cases. Under this condition, moral hazard problems in revenue reporting may arise under fixed salary and performance-based pay systems, and the system manageable by the company is the fixed daily quota system (sanapgeum system). Second, under the fixed salary system, it is acceptable to the company only when the company's profit is positive, regardless of whether total fare revenue management is implemented. Third, when total fare revenue management is implemented, the fixed salary system may give rise to moral hazard problems in drivers' effort input.