This study views the headquarters-foreign subsidiary relationship as a social system driven by power and political dynamics, and investigates the relationships among key behavioral science characteristics that describe this system. Focusing particularly on relational conflict, the study theoretically examines what causes conflict in headquarters-foreign subsidiary relationships and what the consequences of such conflict are, and then empirically tests the validity of the theoretical model using foreign-invested firms operating in Korea, while also seeking to derive practical implications. Although there are various causes of conflict, this study focuses on dependence and power imbalance in headquarters-foreign subsidiary relationships, first analyzing how the formation of headquarters power varies according to the foreign subsidiary's dependence on headquarters and the headquarters' power bases. The results revealed that dependence and power bases, regardless of type, all had a positive effect on the formation of headquarters power, with dependence exerting the strongest influence. However, non-coercive bases partially yielded non-significant results. Subsequently, examining how the level of conflict perceived by foreign subsidiaries varies according to headquarters' power bases, dependence, and power level, it was found that dependence, coercive bases, and power level had positive effects on conflict, while non-coercive bases had negative effects; however, these effects varied depending on the interaction between dependence and power bases. Finally, examining the impact of the degree of relational conflict on the foreign subsidiary's management performance, the results showed that conflict perceived by the foreign subsidiary had a negative effect on its management performance, revealing that conflict is dysfunctional in headquarters-foreign subsidiary relationships as well.