Extant studies have explored the sources of voting premium from the perspectives of either the private benefits of control or the probability of control contests. This study aims to examine which perspective is supported by investigating the relationship between controlling shareholders’ ownership and voting premium with longitudinal data in Korea during 2004 to 2016. We further analyze the interaction effect between controlling shareholders’ ownership and outside blockholders’ ownership on voting premium. Our findings are as follows. First, controlling shareholders’ ownership and voting premium have an inverted U shape relationship, suggesting voting premium increases up to a certain point of controlling shareholders’ ownership after which it decreases. Second, outside blockholders do not mitigate the relationship, implying that outside blockholders do not yet participate in control contests vigorously to the extent of affecting the impact of controlling shareholders’ ownership on voting premium. This study suggests that voting premium arises with controlling shareholders’ ownership and the probability of control contest over the management.