This study aims to verify that managers' decision-making regarding earnings management may differ depending on listing status. This study used the sample period from the first quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of 2012, and the empirical analysis results are as follows. First, income smoothing was found to be greater in unlisted banks. Second, listed banks showed a greater tendency for upward earnings management compared to unlisted banks, and a lesser tendency for downward earnings management. This indicates that listed banks have greater incentives to increase earnings compared to unlisted banks. In summary, while listed banks have higher incentives to increase earnings, unlisted banks exhibit higher incentives to smooth earnings. Additionally, this study further examined whether there are differences in income smoothing and earnings management using loan loss provisions between listed banks where the government has the authority to appoint managers and those where it does not. The results showed that banks where the government has the authority to appoint managers engage in more income smoothing and less upward earnings management. Combining the above research findings, the results suggest that income smoothing and earnings management using loan loss provisions may differ depending on bank characteristics such as listing status and ownership structure. The results of this study are expected to provide useful information not only to subsequent researchers but also to policymakers and capital market participants at the current juncture when Basel III has been partially implemented.