This study was designed to evaluate the potential impact of property rights theory and political market theory on the efficiency improvements that may result from the privatization of public enterprises. This paper is based on the assumption that, although each is perceived as a static concept, property rights theory and political market theory suggest that efficiency improvements resulting from privatization may occur at different times. Because privatized firms lose the market dominance they possessed as public enterprises, property rights theory posits that efficiency improvements can only be achieved when privatization has been fully completed. In contrast, political market theory suggests that efficiency improvements can occur even before privatization takes place, but only when the relative weight placed on economic objectives within the firm increases significantly and managers actively participate in the human capital market. In conclusion, this paper presents a perspective on the widely recognized measure of efficiency—namely, the increase in firm value—while emphasizing the need for empirical analysis of hypotheses that can help both academia and government develop a deeper understanding of effective privatization methodologies.