In a situation like Korea's, where internal corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors and auditors have yet to effectively perform their monitoring functions, managerial monitoring through hostile takeover activities in the market for corporate control is all the more necessary to enhance corporate transparency and protect shareholder wealth. Accordingly, this study conducted a case study of the Midopa M&A, a representative case of hostile takeover in Korea, to understand the mechanisms and institutional problems of the hostile M&A market, and further examined specific policy directions regarding hostile takeovers. Shindongbang, the acquiring firm, attempted to take over management control of Midopa in collaboration with foreign investors, but ultimately failed due to the Federation of Korean Industries' joint defense declaration against hostile M&A and government intervention. Although the Midopa M&A ended in failure, it provided a valuable learning opportunity for understanding the hostile takeover market in Korea. Moreover, by enabling firsthand experience with the role of foreign investors and the effects of legal regulations on them, it significantly contributed to establishing policy directions for creating a fairer and more transparent market environment. In particular, its significance also lies in the fact that it was the first confirmed case demonstrating that, following stock market liberalization, a foreign investor collaborating with a domestic firm to acquire shares in a specific company could actually threaten that company's management control.