This study demonstrates that U.S. investment banks achieve price competitiveness—that is, charge lower spreads to client firms—through two network strategies: a dominance control strategy that strengthens structurally dominant positions within the transaction network to control the opportunistic behavior of other investment banks participating in equity underwriting syndicates, and a network embeddedness strategy that strengthens existing weak ties to secure social capital in the form of information, visibility, and social stability. Furthermore, since investment banks compete with other banks that have similar levels of structural dominance or network embeddedness, organizational density among banks is expected to influence service pricing. Through analysis of U.S. investment bank data from 1985 and 1986, this study demonstrates that control and embeddedness strategies bring about price competitiveness, and that banks in markets with high organizational density lower their service prices while banks in markets with low organizational density maintain high prices, thereby presenting one approach to synthesizing the streams of network research and organizational ecology research.