Does granting salespeople at the customer interface the authority to determine selling prices on a situational basis contribute to firm performance? While there has been considerable theoretical debate for and against delegating pricing authority to salespeople, the scarcity of empirical analyses has made it difficult to provide appropriate decision-making guidelines for management practice. This study represents a modest attempt to bridge this gap between practice and theory. To this end, firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange were surveyed to analyze the effect of delegating pricing authority to salespeople on firm performance through a quantitative approach. The results revealed that many Korean firms partially or fully delegate pricing authority to their salespeople. However, a comparison of firm characteristics by degree of pricing authority delegation showed that the theoretical guidelines for pricing authority delegation, including sales commission systems, were not actually being applied in practice. In particular, firms that fully delegated authority to salespeople paid fixed bonuses or had no established commission standards, and firms that partially delegated authority did not provide sales commissions based on contribution margins. Given that sales commission systems are an important criterion in pricing authority delegation, this suggests that firms need to restructure their sales commission systems before delegating authority. Furthermore, the variables that discriminated the degree of pricing authority delegation were market conditions, salespeople's individual goals, and sales managers' managerial autonomy. The analysis of the relationship between pricing authority delegation and firm performance—the central concern of this study—yielded very interesting results. Korean firms were delegating pricing authority to salespeople based on subjective assessments, but this did not necessarily translate to actual financial performance. The detailed analysis results led to the conclusion that when salespeople have full pricing authority, they are more likely to engage in excessive sales activities by adjusting selling prices to maximize their own sales volume, and when they have no pricing authority at all, they may face limitations in closing transactions with customers. Therefore, partial delegation that provides an appropriate balance of control and autonomy produces the most positive results for firm performance, a finding that has significant implications for strategic decision-making regarding pricing authority delegation.