This paper analyzes the effects of the interactions among competitive strategy of affiliates of Korean large business groups (chaebols), corporate headquarters' control methods over affiliates, and resource sharing among affiliates on affiliate performance. To this end, the three hypotheses proposed by Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) were tested using a sample of 200 affiliates from Korea's top 30 business groups. According to the analysis, Govindarajan and Fisher's claim (Hypothesis 1) that there would be an interactive effect among the level of resource sharing among affiliates, control mechanisms, and competitive strategy on affiliate performance was not supported in the case of Korean large business group affiliates. This result appears to arise because, among the hypotheses that form the basis of their logic, the two hypotheses other than the one regarding the interaction effect between competitive strategy and resource sharing—namely, the interaction effect between competitive strategy and control methods, and the interaction effect between control methods and resource sharing—were not supported. The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) that when an affiliate pursues a differentiation strategy, the interaction effect of high levels of resource sharing and behavior control would positively affect performance was also not supported for Korean large business group affiliates. However, the hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) that when affiliates pursuing a low-cost strategy have high levels of resource sharing and are subject to output control, their performance would improve was supported. An important conclusion drawn from analyzing these results is that whether corporate headquarters should choose management methods for affiliates differentially by considering the strategic context and circumstances of each affiliate, or choose homogeneous management methods based on corporate headquarters' perspective, depends on which management mechanism is under consideration. When the interests of corporate headquarters and affiliates align, as in resource sharing, the affiliates' perspective is more likely to be considered, whereas for management mechanisms where interests conflict, such as control methods, the corporate headquarters' circumstances are likely to be unilaterally considered. The reasons why the analytical results in this paper differ from those of foreign firms include: i) most of Korea's top 30 business groups pursue unrelated diversification, ii) corporate headquarters wield strong authority, iii) most affiliates occupy dominant positions within their respective industries, and iv) most of the sampled affiliates are core businesses within their groups. In addition, logical problems with existing theories were also identified as factors contributing to these results. However, through such inference-based explanations, it was not possible to directly determine whether the differences in research results stem from internal firm characteristics, external circumstances, or fundamental problems in the logic underlying the hypothesis formulation. Therefore, directions for future research to address these issues were presented.