PDF가 표시되지 않으면 여기를 클릭하여 다운로드

1
공정거래위원회 (2024a). 이커머스 시장연구, 정책보고서, https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/callDownload.do?num=261697&filenum=2&dtime=20250919155220, 2025년 7월 접속. (Fair Trade Commission (2024a). E-commerce Market Research, Policy Report, https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/call Download.do?num=261697&filenum=2&dtime=20250919155220) 250919155220, retrieved July 2025.) Google Scholar ›
2
공정거래위원회 (2024b). “소상공인 수수료 부담 낮추고 정산 주기도 단축한다,” 12월 26일, 보도자료, https://www.korea.kr/common/download.do?tblKey=GMN&fileId=198000052, 2025년 6월 접속. (Fair Trade Commission (2024b). “Lowering the Burden of Fees on Small Business and Shortening Settlement Cycles,” December 26, Press Release, https://www.korea.kr/common/download.do?tbl Key=GMN&fileId=198000052, retrieved June 2025.) Google Scholar ›
3
곽주원 (2024). “단일 종가 (從價) 수수료율과 플랫폼의 상품시장 진입,” 법경제학연구, 제21권 2호, pp. 153-171. (Kwak, J.W. (2024). “Single ad Valorem Fee Rate and Platform’s Entry into the Product Market,” Korean Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), pp.153-171.) Google Scholar ›
4
김준호, 임성준, 홍진환 (2012). “신용카드 가맹점 수수료 개선을 위한 정책 연구,” Korea Business Review, 제16권 2호, pp.193-210. (Kim, J. H., Limb, S. J., and Hong, J.H. (2012). “A Study on the Policy of Credit Card Merchant Fee,” Korea Business Review, 16(2), pp.193-210.) Google Scholar ›
5
박해철 (2018). “소매업체가 매출대행을 하는 공급사슬의 최적거래모형,” 경영학연구, 제47권 2호, pp.505-520. (Park, H. C. (2018). “Optimal Transaction Model of a Supply Chain in which Supplier Does a Role of Mediator,” Korea Management Review, 47(2), pp.505-520.) Google Scholar ›
6
박해철 (2019). “온라인쇼핑몰을 위한 최적판매수수료체계,” 한국경영과학회지, 제44권 3호, pp.15-29. (Park, H. C. (2019). “An Optimal Scheme for an Online Shopping Mall Seller Fee Schedule,” Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society, 44(3), pp.15-29.) Google Scholar ›
7
박해철, 현지윤 (2019). “온라인 쇼핑 웹사이트에서 판매 수수료와 제품가격을 어떻게 그리고 누가 결정하는 것이 좋을까?,” 경영학연구, 제48권 6호, pp.1625-1641. (Park, H.C., and Hyun, J.Y. (2019). “How Should They Set Their Seller Fee Schedule and Who Set Their Product Prices for Online Shopping Websites?,” Korea Management Review, 48(6), pp.1625-1641.) Google Scholar ›
8
배경한, 박연수, 박정원, 김지영 (2023). “플랫폼 서비스 가치와 수수료에 대한 경제적 고찰,” 벤처창업연구, 제18권 6호, pp.117-132. (Bae, K. H., Park, Y.S., Park, J.W., and Kim, J.Y. (2023). “Economic Perspectives on Online Platforms: Scenario-based Case Studies,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship, 18(6), pp. 117-132.) Google Scholar ›
9
안봉현, 박해철, 현지윤 (2020). “온라인쇼핑웹사이트의 제품군 설계와 최적변동수수료의 활용,” 한국생산관리학회지, 제31권 4호, pp.379-398. (Ahn, B.H., Park, H.C., and Hyun, J.Y. (2020). “Optimal Design Scheme of Product Groups and Referral Fee Schedule for Online Shopping Websites,” Journal of the Korean Production and Operations Management Society, 31(4), pp.379-398.) Google Scholar ›
10
이신혜 (2022). “카카오 등 선물하기 거래액 年 3.3조... 수수료 30% ‘깜깜이’ 수익창출”, 조선비즈, https://biz.chosun.com/distribution/channel/2022/10/12/A5EH2J7PFZHRDKF2YRTYAGVWGI/, 2025년 3월 접속. (Lee, S. H. (2022). “Gift transactions, including Kakao, reach 3.3 trillion won annually... 30% commissions create "black box" revenue,” Chosun Biz, https://biz.chosun.com/distribution/channel/2022/10/12/A5EH2J7PFZHRDKF2YRTYAGVWGI/, retrieved March 2025.) Google Scholar ›
11
이원호 (2024). “카카오 선물하기 거래액, 코로나 거치며 2배 늘어…연평균 3조원,” MTN 뉴스, https://news.mtn.co.kr/news-detail/2024091212202047524, 2025년 3월 접속. (Lee, W. H. (2024). “Kakao Gifting transaction volume doubles during COVID-19, reaching an annual average of 3 trillion won,” MTN News, https://news.mtn.co.kr/news-detail/2024091212202047524, retrieved March 2025.) Google Scholar ›
12
이철호 (2023). “모바일 상품권 문제점 및 제도개선 방안,” 더불어 민주당 제2차 모바일상품권 대토론회 발제자료. (Lee, C.H. (2023). “Problems with Mobile Gift Coupons and Policy Improvements,” Presentation Materials from the 2nd Mobile Gift Coupons Forum of the Democratic Party of Korea.) Google Scholar ›
13
이태희, 전성민 (2021). “국내 모바일 게임 및 인앱 결제 수수료 적정성에 대한 탐색적 연구,” 한국전자거래학회지, 제26권 3호, pp.55-66. (Lee, T.H., and Jeon, S.M. (2021). “An Exploratory Study on Domestic Mobile Games and In-app Payment Fees,” The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies, 26(3), pp.55-66.) Google Scholar ›
14
조주홍 (2024). “자사 앱으로 고개과 매출 모두 잡는다,” Next Economy, https://www.nexteconomy.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=23122, 2025년 5월 접속. (Cho, J. H. (2024). “Capture both customer and sales with our own app.,” Next Economy, https://news.mtn.co.kr/news-detail/2024091212202047524, retrieved May 2025.) Google Scholar ›
15
통계청 (2024). “2023년 12월 및 연간 온라인쇼핑동향,” 2월 1일 보도자료, https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/callDownload.do?num=247734&filenum=1&dtime=20250919172605, 2025년 4월 접속. (Statistics Korea (2024). Online Shopping Trends for December 2023 and the Year,” February 1, Press Release, https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/call Download.do?num=247734&filenum=1&dtime=20250919172605, retrieved April 2025.) Google Scholar ›
16
통계청 (2025). “2024년 12월 및 연간 온라인쇼핑동향,” 2월 4일 보도자료, https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/callDownload.do?num=262891&filenum=1&dtime=20250919173309, 2025년 1월 접속. (Statistics Korea (2025). Online Shopping Trends for December 2024 and the Year,” February 4, Press Release, https://eiec.kdi.re.kr/policy/call Download.do?num=262891 &filenum=1&dtime=20250919173309, retrieved January 2025.) Google Scholar ›
17
Anderson, S. P., and Bedre Defolie, Ö. (2025). “App Platform Model,” Available at SSRN 5351571. Google Scholar ›
18
Armstrong, M. (2006). “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), pp.668–691. Google Scholar ›
19
Bergemann, D., and Bonatti, A. (2024). “Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms,” American Economic Review, 114(8), pp.2553-2595. Google Scholar ›
20
Belleflamme, P., and Peitz, M. (2021). The Economics of Platforms, Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar ›
21
Bhargava, H. K., Wang, K., and Zhang, X. (2022). “Fending off Critics of Platform Power with Differential Revenue Sharing: Doing Well by Doing Good?,” Management Science, 68(11), pp.8249-8260. Google Scholar ›
22
Chang, Y., Winston, C., and Yan, J. (2022). “Does Uber Benefit Travelers by Price Discrimination?,” The Journal of Law and Economics, 65(S2), pp.S433-S459. Google Scholar ›
23
Cutolo, D., and Kenney, M. (2021). “Platform-dependent Entrepreneurs: Power Asymmetries, Risks, and Strategies in the Platform Economy,” Academy of management perspectives, 35(4), pp.584-605. Google Scholar ›
24
Dawson, J. F. (2014). “Moderation in Management Research: What, Why, When, and How,” Journal of Business and Psychology, 29(1), pp.1-19. Google Scholar ›
25
De Cornière, A., Mantovani, A., and Shekhar, S. (2025). “Third-degree Price Discrimination in Two-sided Markets,” Management Science, 71(4), pp.3340-3356. Google Scholar ›
26
Jiang, Y., Liu, F., and Lim, A. (2021). “Digital Coupon Promotion and Platform Selection in the Presence of Delivery Effort,” Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 62, 102612. Google Scholar ›
27
Edelman, B., and Wright, J. (2015). “Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(3), pp.1283-1328. Google Scholar ›
28
Evans, D. S. (2003). “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets,” Yale Journal on Regulation, 20(2), pp.325-382. Google Scholar ›
29
Gomes, R., and Mantovani, A. (2025). “Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 23(1), pp.190–235. Google Scholar ›
30
Gong, D., Liu, S., Tang, M., Ren, L., Liu, J., and Liu, X. (2018). “Revenue Sharing or Profit Sharing? An Internet Production Perspective,” Advances in Production Engineering & Management, 13(1), pp.81-92. Google Scholar ›
31
Gu, G., and Zhu, F. (2021). “Trust and Disintermediation: Evidence from an Online Freelance Marketplace,” Management Science, 67(2), pp.794-807. Google Scholar ›
32
Hayes, A. F. (2022). “Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach,” Third Edition, Guilford publications. Google Scholar ›
33
Jacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., and Gawer, A. (2018). “Towards a Theory of Ecosystems,” Strategic management journal, 39(8), pp.2255-2276. Google Scholar ›
34
Johnson, J. P. (2017). “The Agency Model and MFN Clauses,” The Review of Economic Studies, 84(3), pp.1151-1185. Google Scholar ›
35
Keng, S. L., Seah, S. T., Tong, E. M., and Smoski, M. (2016). “Effects of Brief Mindful Acceptance Induction on Implicit Dysfunctional Attitudes and Concordance between Implicit and Explicit Dysfunctional Attitudes,” Behaviour research and therapy, 83, pp.1-10. Google Scholar ›
36
Ladd, T. (2022). “The Achilles’ Heel of the Platform Business Model: Disintermediation,” Business Horizons, 65(3), pp.277-289. Google Scholar ›
37
Ladd, T., Barlow, R., Giannini, B. and Pflaum, A. (2024). “Decentralized Autonomous Organizations as a Threat to Centralized Platforms: Applying and Expanding Theories of Platform Competition and Disintermediation,” In Proceedings 57th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), pp.6340-6349, https://hdl.handle.net/10125/10714. Google Scholar ›
38
Lee, K. H., and Musolff, L. (2025). “Two-Sided Markets Shaped by Platform-Guided Search,” Working Paper, https://lmusolff.com/papers/TwoSidedMarketsPlatformGuidedSearch.pdf. Google Scholar ›
39
Li, B. G., Mc Andrews, J., and Wang, Z. (2020). “Two-sided Market, R&D, and Payments System Evolution,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 115, pp.180-199. Google Scholar ›
40
Li, Z., and Wang, G. (2025). “Regulating Powerful Platforms: Evidence from Commission Fee Caps,” Information Systems Research, 36(1), pp.126-140. Google Scholar ›
41
Lu, W., Goldfarb, A., and Mehta, N. (2025). “Product Development and Platform Fees Design,” Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4617897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4617897. Google Scholar ›
42
Mantovani, A., Piga, C.A., and Reggiani, C. (2021). “Online Platform Price Parity Clauses: Evidence from the EU Booking.com Case,” European Economic Review, 131, 103625. Google Scholar ›
43
Micallef, M., Keränen, J., and Kokshagina, O. (2023). “The (un) Intended Consequences of Multi-sided Platform Adoption for Different Actors in Business Networks,” Industrial Marketing Management, 115, pp.214-227. Google Scholar ›
44
Rochet, J.C., and Tirole, J. (2003). “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4), pp.990–1029. Google Scholar ›
45
Rochet, J.C., and Tirole, J. (2006). “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,” Rand Journal of Economics, 37(3), pp.645-667. Google Scholar ›
46
Rysman, M. (2009). “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets,” the Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(3), pp.125–143. Google Scholar ›
47
Schmalensee, R., and Evans, D. S., (2007). “Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms,” Competition Policy International, 3(1), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=987341. Google Scholar ›
48
Spiller, S. A., Fitzsimons, G. J., Lynch Jr, J. G., and McClelland, G. H. (2013). “Spotlights, Floodlights, and the Magic Number Zero: Simple Effects Tests in Moderated Regression,” Journal of marketing research, 50(2), pp.277-288. Google Scholar ›
49
Sullivan, M. (2024). “Price Controls in a Multi-sided Market,” Technical report, Working paper. Google Scholar ›
50
Teh, T. H., Liu, C., Wright, J., and Zhou, J. (2023). “Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(4), pp.68-113. Google Scholar ›
51
Tirole, J., and Bisceglia, M. (2025). “Fair Gatekeeping in Digital Ecosystems,” Working Papers hal-04963106, HAL. Google Scholar ›
52
Tremblay, M. (2023). “The Limits of Marketplace Fee Discrimination,” NET Institute Working Paper No. #20-10, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3729378 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3729378. Google Scholar ›
53
Wang, Z., and Wright, J. (2017). “Ad Valorem Platform Fees, Indirect Taxes, and Efficient Price Discrimination,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 48(2), pp.467-484. Google Scholar ›
54
Wang, C., and Wright, J. (2025). “Regulating Platform Fees,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 23(2), pp.746-783. Google Scholar ›

디지털 플랫폼의 수수료 차별화 요인에 관한 실증연구: 모바일쿠폰 선물하기 시장을 중심으로