This study investigates how the unfaithful disclosure corporations have an effect on the market in case that their penalty points are replaced with fines for noncompliance with disclosure obligations. The current system permits the unfaithful disclosure corporations to substitute the penalty points that impose some or all of the penalty points as fines if they meet certain requirements. This system assumes that penalty points and fines have the same effects of sanctions. If this assumption is for the purpose of the system, it is expected that there will be no differential market reaction to the replacement of the penalty points. As a result of the empirical analysis, it was found that the market showed relatively less negative stock price reaction to corporations that replaced the penalty points with fines at the date of designation of unfaithful disclosure corporations. This indicates that the market reacts differently to whether the penalty points are replaced with fines or not, unlike the purpose of the current system assuming that penalty points and the replacement of penalty points will have the same effects of sanctions. On the other hands, the Exchange reinforced the sanctions by raising the fine per penalty point. Additional analysis was carried out accordingly in order to find out whether the effects of raised fines to be borne by corporations on market reaction are changed. In additional analysis, these results were consistent even if the amount of fines for penalty points was raised. This means that the market still shows less negative reaction to corporations that replaced the penalty points with fines, regardless of the amount of fines for each penalty. In addition, it was found that if corporations that replaced the penalty points with fines were re-designated as unfaithful disclosure corporations, their levels of disclosure violation were significantly higher than a case where corporations on which penalty points had been imposed where re-designated. This results mean that the replacement of penalty points with fines has less effect than the penalty points, which is consistent with the result of the main analysis. Therefore, it seems necessary to reinforce requirements for the replacement of penalty points with fines or impose additional penalty points and fines if a corporation that replaces the penalty points with fines is re-designated. This study is meaningful in that it is the first study that verifies the effects of the replacement of penalty points with fine, and the results suggest the need to improve the system of fines for noncompliance with disclosure obligations.