This study empirically analyzes the effect of affiliation with large business groups on the individual executive compensation disclosure that became mandatory starting with the 2013 business reports. Specifically, it examines whether there are differences in individual executive compensation disclosure, the specificity of compensation disclosure (disclosure quality), and the submission timing of business reports containing compensation disclosures depending on affiliation with large business groups, and whether board independence affects such disclosure behaviors. The research findings are summarized as follows. After controlling for various variables affecting disclosure, affiliation with a large business group showed a significant positive relationship with individual executive compensation disclosure, and also showed a significant positive relationship with the degree of specificity of individual executive compensation disclosure. These results indicate that firms affiliated with large business groups, which face substantial political costs related to compensation disclosure, have strong incentives to comply with legally mandated disclosure requirements while simultaneously providing more detailed information to reduce the direct and indirect political costs that may arise after executive compensation is made public. Next, the empirical analysis of whether firms strategically chose the timing of their 2013 business report disclosure revealed that firms affiliated with large business groups exhibited a disclosure behavior of delaying their 2013 business report disclosure closer to the filing deadline. This can be interpreted as large business group affiliates simultaneously releasing their business reports near the filing deadline to disperse the focus of media and public attention concentrated on them. Meanwhile, examining the role of board independence among firms affiliated with large business groups revealed that higher board independence was associated with increased likelihood of individual executive compensation disclosure, more detailed executive compensation disclosure, and relatively less tendency to delay business report disclosure until the filing deadline. This implies that firms with higher board independence face relatively less burden regarding compensation disclosure due to greater transparency in executive compensation and have stronger incentives to provide investors with more detailed information about executive compensation, suggesting that opportunistic disclosure behavior is relatively less prevalent. This study is significant in that it extends prior research by utilizing the institutional setting of newly introduced legislation regarding executive compensation disclosure, and the finding that the quality of executive compensation disclosure varies across firms due to enforcement regulations left to corporate discretion provides policy implications suggesting that policymakers need to properly achieve the objectives of executive compensation disclosure through more meticulous regulatory review and implementation measures.