Unlike prior research, this study examines the implications of CEO turnover in subsidiaries belonging to business groups at the business group level, and investigates the differences in the utilization of managerial human resources between chaebol groups and non-chaebol groups. To this end, this study included the post-turnover destinations of CEOs among listed companies belonging to business groups in the analysis, and distinguished business groups into chaebol groups and non-chaebol groups to conduct group-level analyses. Examining CEO turnovers that occurred in subsidiaries belonging to business groups between 2001 and 2007, we found that CEO turnover in subsidiaries of Korean business groups manifested either as internal transfer to another subsidiary within the same group or as external exit from the business group. While a significant negative relationship was found between subsidiary performance and CEO external exit, CEO internal transfer did not have a significant relationship with firm performance. Additionally, CEO turnover in subsidiaries belonging to non-chaebol groups more frequently took the form of external exit, and the negative relationship between subsidiary performance and CEO external exit was found to be weakened in chaebol groups. This appears to be because, considering the imperfections and information asymmetry of external markets, large diversified business groups such as chaebols can more easily utilize CEOs through internal labor markets. In other words, in the case of highly diversified and large chaebol groups, competent CEOs suited to the chaebol's distinctive corporate culture can be efficiently secured through internal markets, which is why CEO turnover in subsidiaries frequently occurs in the form of intra-group transfers. This implies that, from a corporate governance perspective, there is a greater incentive for CEO turnover through internal transfer rather than external exit as a means of strategic utilization of CEO talent and subsidiary control. Conversely, in the case of non-chaebol groups, securing superior talent is more difficult, and because the business group is relatively smaller in scale, there is a greater incentive to secure and utilize professional managers from external sources rather than through internal markets, which is why CEO turnover is closely related to firm performance and more frequently takes the form of external exit. The results of this study demonstrate that CEO turnover phenomena occur due to different incentives in chaebol and non-chaebol groups, and suggest that the characteristics of business groups, including corporate governance, should be considered as factors influencing CEO turnover.