This paper investigates the influence of ownership structure and other firm characteristics on corporate cash holdings. Specifically, I investigate the nature of the relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings and whether this relationship is affected by other characteristics of ownership structure of firms. Using data from 372 listed companies in Korea from 1999 to 2003, I find that the ownership structure of firms plays an important role in determining the level of cash holdings. The level has a non-monotonic relationship with the managerial ownership: Cash holdings are positively related at lower levels of ownership(0% to 5%) but the relationship is reversed at higher levels of ownership(5% to 25%). The relation becomes positive again at high levels of ownership(over 25%), which is however, statistically insignificant. These results suggest that management move from entrenchment to alignment, and to entrenchment again as their ownership in the firm increase: Managers are entrenched at lower levels of ownership and can hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of other shareholders and/or managers may wish to protect their human capital with a cash buffer at lower levels. However, cash holdings are negatively related at higher levels of ownership since the incentive alignment effect of increased managerial ownership dominates the entrenchment effect. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the nature of managerial ownership and the cash holdings’ relationship changes in the presence of a large shareholder with significant control rights. The strong positive relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings at lower levels of ownership is not significant in the firms with controllers. However, this positive relationship is more prevail in widely-held firms. This indicates that the large shareholder with significant control rights mitigates managerial discretion accumulating large amount of cash for private benefits. In addition, the identity of a controlling shareholder seems to have different impacts on managerial attitude towards cash holding decisions. Financial institutions as controllers have more impact on firm's choices of cash holdings than families and companies. I also find that the cash-holding level, compared with non-group corporations, tends to be significantly lower in the case of the affiliated firms in conglomerates, an additional advantage over unaffiliated firms. Finally, the results reveal that firms tend to hold more cash when they are smaller, as well as having larger growth opportunities and more volatile cash flows, while firms with more net working capital and bank debt tend to maintain less cash holdings. These results are consistent with those suggested by previous empirical studies.