Research Article
The Relationship among Corporate Capital Structure, Ownership Structure, Size, and Managers' Earnings Modification Incentives
Published: January 1991 · Vol. 21, No. 1 · pp. 209-244
Full Text
Abstract
This study empirically analyzed whether capital structure, governance structure, and firm size, as incentives for managerial earnings manipulation, have explanatory power for listed companies in Korea. Methodologically, matched-pair design and analysis of covariance techniques were employed, and the shortcomings of prior studies were improved by controlling for exogenous variables such as industry. However, the analysis results showed that the three variables generally lacked statistical significance. Consequently, this study reached the tentative conclusion that the capital structure hypothesis, governance structure hypothesis, and size hypothesis may not hold under the Korean business environment. The fundamental causes underlying these results were examined, including deficiencies in Korea's accounting system, the general lack of awareness regarding accounting, and the structural characteristics of Korean listed companies.
