The determination of corporate ownership structure has been addressed from the perspectives of corporate evolutionary development and agency problems by scholars such as Berle and Means, Demsetz and Lehn, Fama, and Lim Eung-ki, and while research on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate behavior (including performance) has been conducted, research on the determinants of ownership structure remains insufficient. This study derives the determinants of ownership structure by comprehensively examining the corporate survival system and incentives for securing control rights from the perspectives of agency theory, transaction cost economics (new institutional economics), and the theory of the firm, and attempts an empirical investigation thereof. The results showed that firm size had a statistically significant negative relationship, managerial ownership share had a positive relationship, and market structure and risk also exhibited positive relationships, with differences observed depending on affiliation with business group conglomerates. For further advancement of this research, the establishment of a corporate behavior model that accounts for Korea's unique institutional environment, as well as improvements in the measurement of variables such as ownership concentration and in methodology, are required.