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korean management review - Vol. 47 , No. 2

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[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 505-520
Abbreviation: kmr
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Apr 2018
Received 27 Feb 2018 Accepted 26 Mar 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2018.47.2.505
Optimal Transaction Model of a Supply Chain in which Supplier Does a Role of Mediator
Haechurl Park^*
*Professor, Business School, Chung-Ang University, First Author

소매업체가 매출대행을 하는 공급사슬의 최적거래모형
박해철^*

*(주저자) 중앙대학교 경영경제대학 경영학부 (hpark@cau.ac.kr)

Abstract

This study deals with a supply chain which has a monopolistic retailor and a supplier when the demand pattern follows a normal distribution for a given retail price, in which the retailor takes a role as an intermediary or a mediator whose role is to coordinate and mediate the sales process between a supplier and retail customers. So this supply chain applies a different transaction scheme from the traditional one which might cause the issue of double marginalization problem between suppliers and retailors.

The objective of the study is not only to find the optimal retail pricing scheme which maximizes the profit through the entire supply chain but also simultaneously to guarantee a certain level of incentive compatibility for both of the firms to participate in the transaction. Also we want to understand the reason why the firms in such a transaction environment tend to want to adopt a fixed amount of transaction fee in addition to a sliding scale fee proportionally depending on retail sales volume, which is called the two-part tariff scheme.

Our analysis demonstrates that the optimal transaction stems from the scheme based on the marginal cost ratio, which is the ratio of each firm’s marginal cost in total marginal costs the whole supply chain spends as follows: The first step of the optimal policy requires that each firm takes its share from the retail sales revenue proportional to its marginal cost ratio. It appears to be that it is unavoidable for them to end up with a less amount of retail sales revenue if they apply a different ratio. The second step is to adopt a fixed amount transaction fee reflecting each firm's relative bargaining power.

초록

본 연구는 소매수요가 정규분포를 따르는 공급사슬에서 독점적인 지위를 가지고 있는 하나의 소매업체가 공급업체의 제품판매를 대행하거나 중개하는 역할을 하는 경우를 다루고 있다. 이러한 경우에는 공급업체와 소매업체 간의 전통적인 거래과정에서 발생하는 이중이익부과의 문제가 발생하지 않는 것이 일반적이다. 연구의 목적은 이와 같은 공급사슬에 대하여 양 업체에게 유인부합성이 있도록 하는 최적소매가격과 이를 보장하는 양 업체 간의 거래 및 결제방법을 발견하고자 하는 것이다. 또한 양 업체가 사전계약에 의해 매출을 일정비율로 나누어 이윤을 성취하는 거래형태를 가지고 있는 공급사슬들이, 거래결제를 위한 수단으로서 매출수입에 연동되는 변동수수료와 매출수입과는 독립적인 정액수수료의 두 가지 결제방법을 병행하는 이부가격제를 주로 운영하고 있는 배경을 이해하고자 한다. 분석결과 공급사슬의 양 주체는 변동수수료의 경우에는 전체공급사슬이 지출하는 총 한계비용 중에서 서로의 한계비용이 차지하는 비율에 따라 일차적으로 매출수입을 나누어 가져야 최적성이 보장된다는 것을 증명하였다. 그렇지 못한 경우에는 전체공급사슬의 매출수입이 줄어들게 되어 양 업체의 이윤최대화가 어렵게 된다. 그리고 매출수입을 배분하는 과정에서 양 업체의 거래협상력 등이 반영되도록 하는 역할은 정액수수료의 적절한 책정을 통하여 수행하여야 한다는 사실을 밝혀내었다.


Keywords: supply chain, double marginalization, optimal retail price, two-part tariff, marginal cost ratio, fixed fee, sliding scale fee 키워드: 공급사슬, 이중이익부과, 최적소매가격, 이부가격제, 한계비용비율, 정액수수료, 변동수수료

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• 저자 박해철은 현재 중앙대학교 경영경제대학 경영학부의 경영과학/운영관리 분야의 교수로 재직 중이다. 연세대학교 상경대학 응용통계학과에서 경제학사를, KAIST 경영과학과에서 석사학위를 취득하였다. 이후 미국 예일대학교에서 경영학 박사학위를 취득하였고, 이후에는 AT&T Bell Laboratories의 Department of Operations Research에서 연구위원(Member of Technical Staff)으로 근무하면서 다양한 OR이론들을 기업운영에 활용하거나 통신망의 관리에 응용하는 연구를 하였다. 한국생산관리학회장을 역임하였고 주요 연구분야는 확률적 계량모형 및 의사결정이론 등이다.