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korean management review - Vol. 47 , No. 2

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korean management review - Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 425-449
Abbreviation: kmr
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Apr 2018
Received 09 Oct 2017 Revised 04 Feb 2018 Accepted 14 Feb 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2018.47.2.425
The Impact of the Difference between Cash Flow Rights and Voting Rights on R&D Investments: Connected to the Level of Cash Flow Rights
Eun-Jin Song^*
*Lecturer, Department of Global Business Administration, College of Social Science, SeoKyeong University, Seoul, Korea, First Author

배당권과 의결권 차이가 연구개발 투자에 미치는 영향: 배당권 크기와 연계
송은진^*

*(단독저자) 서경대학교 글로벌경영학과 (dmswls728@naver.com)

Abstract

This study analyzed whether the ownership divergence (the difference between cash flow rights and voting rights of owner managers) can make effects on R&D investments of the firm. If R&D project is successful, corporate value will get higher and shareholders can get profits. However, since the success of a R&D is not certain, managers may not want to take an unnecessary risk.

In owner manager companies, agency problems can occur between owner managers and external minority shareholders. Especially when there is big difference between cash flow rights and voting rights of owner managers, the owner manager’s moral hazard can be intensified. The effects of ownership divergence on R&D investment were analyzed and the relationship between them was connected to the level of cash flow rights. Additionally, it was attempted to identify from which shares the negative effects of ownership divergence on R&D investment were made.

The empirical evidences are as follows. The ownership divergence made negative effects on R&D investment in the private companies with low cash flow rights of owner managers, which supported hypothesis. In other words, the effects of ownership divergence on R&D investment were confirmed when the size of cash flow rights was controlled. It can be interpreted that low cash flow rights intensify the moral hazard of owner managers. In the further analysis separating cash flow rights and voting rights, entrenchment effect of the voting rights was confirmed and negative effects of ownership divergence were supported.

초록

본 연구는 소유경영자의 배당권과 의결권 차이(지분율 괴리)가 연구개발 투자(이하 R&D 투자)에 어떠한 영향을 주는지 분석하였다. R&D 투자는 성공할 경우 기업에 막대한 부를 가져오지만, 투자결과가 불확실하기 때문에 경영자의 위험선호도에 따라 영향 받을 수 있다. 소유경영자 기업의 경우에는 소유경영자와 외부 소액주주 사이에 대리인 문제가 발생하며, 소유경영자의 배당권과 의결권 차이가 클 때 심화될 수 있다. 즉 배당권과 의결권 차이가 클수록 소유경영자의 도덕적 해이가 심화될 수 있으며, 지분율 괴리의 크기가 동일하더라도 배당권의 크기가 낮은 경우에 기업가치 제고를 위한 R&D 투자에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 것으로 예측하였다.

실증분석 결과, 지분율 괴리는 배당권이 낮은 표본에서 R&D 투자에 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 관찰되어 가설을 지지하였다. 이는 R&D 투자에 미치는 지분율 괴리의 영향은 배당권 크기를 통제할 때 확인할 수 있으며, 낮은 배당권이 소유경영자의 도덕적 해이를 심화시키는 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 또한 배당권과 의결권을 분리한 추가분석에서도 의결권의 보호막 효과가 확인되어 지분율 괴리의 부정적 효과를 지지하는 결과가 나타났다.


Keywords: R&D investment, agency costs, ownership divergence, cash flow rights, voting rights 키워드: R&D 투자, 대리인 비용, 지분율 괴리, 배당권, 의결권

Acknowledgments

본 논문은 주저자의 박사학위 논문의 일부를 요약하고 수정하여 작성되었습니다.

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• 저자 송은진은 현재 서경대학교 글로벌경영학과 시간강사로 재직 중이다. 서경대학교 회계학과를 졸업하였으며, 숙명여자대학교에서 박사학위를 취득하였다. 숙명여자대학교 경영학과, 가천대학교 글로벌경영학과, 서경대학교 글로벌경영학과에서 강의하였다. 주요 연구 분야는 R&D, 기업소유구조, 가치평가 등이 있다.