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korean management review - Vol. 49 , No. 2
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korean management review - Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 391-414
Abbreviation: kmr
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Apr 2020
Received 11 Nov 2019 Revised 02 Feb 2020 Accepted 10 Feb 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2020.49.2.391

The Effect of Participative Target Setting on Performance Measure Drop
Bum-Joon Kim*
*Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, The Catholic University of Korea, First Author

참여적 목표설정이 성과평가지표 탈락에 미치는 영향
김범준*
*(단독저자) 가톨릭대학교 회계학과 (raphaelkim@catholic.ac.kr)
Funding Information ▼
Abstract

This study investigates how the ratee’s participation in the target setting process affects performance measure drop. In general, we evaluate performance by comparing actual performance to target in quantitative performance measures. It is very interesting research topic to examine whether the level of ratee’s participation in target setting process affects the performance measure selection because it is different by target setting method of performance measure.

According to the prior literature, it is known that participative target setting provides the ratees the perception of procedural fairness in the evaluation process, thereby motivating them to work hard. In the other side, there is also an incentive for ratees to utilize private information to make budgetary slack in participative target setting process when there is information asymmetry between rater and ratee. Thus, I expect that designers of a performance evaluation system will consider countervailing two incentives when he decides to drop performance measure. Using performance evaluation results of Korean public companies from 1985 to 2011, I investigate how participative target setting affect performance measure drop. As a result, I find that participative target setting does not significantly affect the performance measure drop. However, I find that the common measure is relatively less likely to be dropped compared to the unique measure because common measure is more informative than unique measure due to relative performance evaluation. These findings suggest that participative target setting influences performance measure drop differently depending on the performance measure characteristics like common versus unique measure. This study contributes to expand research stream in performance measure choice.

초록

본 연구는 목표설정 과정에서 피평가자의 참여수준이 성과평가지표 탈락에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 일반적으로 계량지표는 사전에 목표를 설정한 후 목표와 실적을 비교하여 성과를 평가한다. 따라서, 목표설정방법은 성과평가에 중요한 요소일 뿐만 아니라, 목표설정과정에서 피평가자의 참여여부가 성과평가지표 선택에도 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 목표설정 과정에서 참여적 목표설정방법을 사용하면 피평가자가 평가과정의 공정성이 높다고 지각하여 더 많은 노력을 투입할 수 있다. 그러나, 참여적 목표설정방법을 사용하더라도 정보비대칭이 존재하면 피평가자가 사적정보를 활용하여 자신에게 유리한 목표를 설정할 가능성도 존재한다. 따라서, 성과평가시스템의 설계자는 성과평가지표를 선택하는 과정에서 목표설정방법에 따른 피평가자의 상반된 인센티브를 고려할 필요가 있다. 본 연구는 1985년부터 2011년까지 국내 공기업 경영평가 자료를 활용하여 계량지표의 참여적 목표설정이 성과지표 탈락에 미치는 영향을 연구하였다. 실증 분석결과, 전체 표본을 대상으로 한 연구에서는 목표설정 과정에서의 피평가자의 참여수준이 평가지표 탈락에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않았지만, 공통지표는 고유지표와 비교하여 참여형 목표설정 지표가 상대적으로 덜 탈락한다는 사실을 발견하였다. 이러한 연구결과는 참여형 목표설정이라 하더라도 평가지표의 정보비대칭 수준에 따라 성과평가지표 탈락에 차별적으로 영향을 미친다는 점을 시사하며, 성과평가지표 탈락과 관련된 기존 연구를 확장하였다는 점에서 공헌점이 있다.

Keywords: Performance Measure Drop, Target Setting, Participation, Common Measure, Unique Measure
키워드: 성과평가지표 탈락, 목표설정, 피평가자 참여, 공통지표, 고유지표
Acknowledgments

본 연구는 저자의 박사학위 논문 “Essays on Performance Measure Drops and Weight Changes”의 일부를 대폭 수정 및 발전시켜 작성되었습니다. 또한, 2017년 대한민국 교육부와 한국연구재단의 지원을 받아 수행되었습니다(NRF-2017S1A5A8021763). 본 논문의 발전에 유익한 조언을 해 주신 익명의 심사위원님과 연구 과정에서 공기업 경영평가와 관련된 유익한 조언을 해 주신 경희대학교 최연식 교수님께도 감사드립니다.

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• 저자 김범준은 현재 가톨릭대학교 회계학과 부교수로 재직 중이다. 서울대학교 경영학과를 졸업하고 동 대학원에서 회계학 전공으로 경영학 석사 및 박사학위를 취득하였다. 정보통신정책연구원(KISDI) 주임연구원, 삼정회계법인 공인회계사 및 삼일PwC컨설팅 Senior Manager로 근무하였다. 주요연구분야는 성과평가 및 보상, 기업지배구조, 회계감사 등이다.

 
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