
가족의 경영참여, 임금격차, 그리고 미래주가폭락위험 간의 관련성
Copyright 2025 THE KOREAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
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초록
본 연구는 기업내 수직적 임금격차와 미래 주가폭락위험 간의 관련성을 분석하여 우리나라 기업의 임금격차 발생요인을 추론해 보고자 한다. 특히 창업자 가족의 경영참여 정도와 경영승계 여부에 따른 차이를 심층적으로 분석한다. 실증분석 결과, 임금격차와 미래 주가폭락위험 간에는 유의한 관련성이 발견되지 않았다. 이는 우리나라 기업의 임금격차가 효율적인 계약 과정에서 발생한 결과일 수 있는 동시에, 미흡한 지배구조 하에서 경영자의 강한 협상력이 반영된 결과일 수 있음을 시사한다. 그러나 가족의 경영참여도가 높을수록 임금격차와 미래 주가폭락위험 간에 유의한 양(+)의 관련성이 나타났다. 특히 가족기업을 대상으로 한 분석에서는 후속세대가 경영하는 기업에 한하여 이러한 양(+)의 관련성이 확인되었다. 이러한 결과는, 가족기업에서의 임금격차 확대가 미흡한 내부 감시∙견제 메커니즘에서 기인할 수 있으며, 이러한 부정적 영향이 후속세대 가족기업에서 더욱 두드러질 수 있음을 시사한다.
Abstract
This study examines the relationship between vertical wage disparity (hereinafter wage disparity, WD) within firms and future stock price crash risk (hereinafter CR) to identify the causes contributing to WD in Korean companies. Specifically, it analyzes how this relationship varies according to the level of founder family involvement in management and generational succession. Using data from non-financial firms listed on the KOSPI from 2002 to 2022, the study finds no systematic relationship between WD and CR. However, a significant positive relationship between WD and CR is observed as family involvement in management increases. Notably, among family firms, this positive relationship is only present in firms managed by subsequent generations. These findings suggest that expanding WD in family firms may result from insufficient internal monitoring and control mechanisms, and these negative effects may be more pronounced in family firms managed by subsequent generations.
Keywords:
Wage disparity, Efficient contracting, Managerial rent-seeking, Stock price crash risk, Family firm, Generational succession, Agency problem키워드:
임금격차, 효율적 계약가설, 경영자 지대추구, 주가폭락위험, 가족기업, 후속세대 경영승계, 대리인 비용Acknowledgments
이 논문은 2023년 대한민국 교육부와 한국연구재단의 인문사회분야 신진연구자지원사업의 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임(NRF-2023S1A5A8081823). This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF-2023S1A5A8081823).
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∙저자 박선영은 현재 경북대학교 행정학부의 조교수로 재직 중이다. 이화여자대학교를 졸업하였으며, KDI 국제정책대학원에서 석사, 이화여자대학교에서 경영학 박사를 취득하였다. 주요 연구 분야는 민간 및 공공 부문의 회계, 감사 및 거버넌스 등이다.