Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 52, No. 2, pp.303-338
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Apr 2023
Received 04 Oct 2022 Revised 11 Jan 2023 Accepted 03 Feb 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2023.52.2.303

이해관계자 이론의 비판적 검토

Woonghee Lee
Hanyang University victory@hanyang.ac.kr
A Critical Examination of Stakeholder Theory


Copyright 2011 THE KOREAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0, which permits unrestricted, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

Although there exists a significant body of research that criticizes stakeholder theory overseas, it has not been actively discussed in Korea. Five major problems of stakeholder theory are identifed through extensive literature review. First, Freeman’s definition of stakeholder, which is still widely used, is simply too ambiguous. Stakeholder theorists not only include competitors, government and media as stakeholders, but they also include animals and terrorists as stakeholders. Second, imposing multiple fiduciary duties to stakeholders is unethical by itself and may result in manager’s moral hazard. Third, since the interests of stakeholders are well protected by contract law and regulation, additional protection may be redundant. Fourth, stakeholder theorists have been insisting on stakeholder participation on the board (especially labor). But evidence from Germany suggests that it is not working well. Fifth, so-called ‘stakeholder management’ is even more ambiguous and simply re-state existing managerial principles. In addition, three misunderstandings about shareholder primacy model are discussed. First, the purpose of shareholder primacy model is to protect shareholders because shareholders, who are residual claimants, are the most vulnerable stakeholder among all other stakeholders. Second, the current shareholder primacy model does not assume that shareholders ‘own’ the corporation. Third, it was the managers who harmed the company and shareholders in financial scandals such as Enron and Worldcom, not the other way around. Finally, it is suggested that long-term shareholder view can also protect stakeholders’ interests as much as stakeholder theory promises.

Keywords:

Stakeholder Theory, Shareholder Primacy, Freeman, Fiduciary Duty

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∙ The author Woonghee Lee is currently a professor at Hanyang University Business School. He graduated from Yonsei University Business School. He received MBA from the University of Illinois, Champaign, and Ph.D. from the Ohio State University in strategic management. After he got his Ph.D., he worked as a chief researcher at Samsung Economic Research Institute in Seoul, Korea. His research interests include corporate strategies that draws on economic theories such as institutional economics and Austrian economics.