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korean management review - Vol. 55, No. 1

[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 54, No. 6, pp. 1619-1639
Abbreviation: kmr
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Dec 2025
Received 12 Jun 2025 Revised 16 Jul 2025 Accepted 22 Jul 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2025.54.6.1619

Responding to Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Institutional Pressures and Strategic Response of Korean Firms
Young Hoon An
(First Author) Pusan National University College of Business (y.h.an@pusan.ac.kr)

안영훈
(주저자) 부산대학교 경영학과

Copyright 2025 THE KOREAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0, which permits unrestricted, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Abstract

This study explores how Korean firms use bribery and political network development as a strategic response to institutional pressures and bureaucratic inefficiencies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Based on in-depth interviews with ten Korean entrepreneurs operating across various SSA countries, the research finds that Korean firms frequently utilize petty bribery initially to counteract unethical demands from low-ranking government officials and to expedite administrative processes. However, this approach is short-lived and fails to yield sustainable competitive advantages. Instead, long-term success in these complex institutional environments relies on cultivating trust-based, reciprocal relationships with high- level government officials. These relationships, founded on mutual strategic benefit rather than merely financial exchanges, enable firms to mitigate bureaucratic obstacles and reduce dependency on low-level corruption over time. Nevertheless, the pressure to engage in petty corruption remains a continuous challenge, often compelling firms to maintain these ethically ambiguous practices. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of non-market strategies in weak institutional contexts and offers practical insights into how foreign firms manage corruption-related challenges in emerging markets.


Keywords: Corruption, Non-market strategy, Political Network, LOF (Liability of Foreignness), Sub- Saharan Africa

Acknowledgments

This research is supported by a New Faculty Research Grant of Pusan National University 2025


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∙ The author Young Hoon An is an assistant professor at Pusan National University. He received PhD from the University of Manchester. His research interest is in nonmarket strategies and socio-economic impact of multinational enterprises. His works appeared in International Business Review, Journal of International Management, Multinational Business Review, among others.