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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 53, No. 4, pp.901-922
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Aug 2024
Received 15 Mar 2024 Revised 15 Apr 2024 Accepted 22 Apr 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2024.53.4.901

신용등급에 반영된 내부정보의 성격과 기업의 공시행태

강동창 ; 김정택
(주저자) 동양미래대학교 세무회계학과 부교수 / 서강대학교 박사과정 Associate Professor eastwindow72@daum.net
(교신저자) 단국대학교 경영학부 조교수 jtkim01@dankook.ac.kr
Firm Specific Information in Credit Ratings and Disclosure Behavior
Dongchang Kang ; Jeong-Taek Kim
(First Author) Department of Accounting & Taxation, Dongyang Mirae University / Ph.D candidate, Business Administration, Sogang University eastwindow72@daum.net
(Corresponding Author) Assistant Professor, School of Business Administration, Dankook University jtkim01@dankook.ac.kr


Copyright 2024 THE KOREAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0, which permits unrestricted, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

초록

본 연구는 신용등급에 영향을 미치는 비계량적 기업내부정보의 성격에 따라 기업의 공시행태가 어떻게 달라지는지 조사한다. 신용평가사가 부여한 신용등급과 회계․재무변수를 바탕으로 추정한 기대신용도 간의 차이(신용등급 괴리값)를 신용등급에 반영된 기업내부정보로 정의하고, 주가동조성을 기업의 사적정보 공시수준의 대용치로 사용하여 실증분석한 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 신용등급 괴리값이 큰 기업일수록 평균적으로 주가동조성이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 기대신용도보다 높은(낮은) 신용등급을 부여받은 기업일수록 사적정보를 시장에 전달할 유인이 작음(큼)을 시사한다. 둘째, 자체신용도 공시제도가 시행된 2018년 이후에는 신용등급 괴리값과 주가동조성 간의 양(+)의 관계가 약화된 것으로 나타났다. 이는 자체신용도 공시 의무화 이후에 신용등급 괴리값이 큰 기업들이 유리한 사적정보를 적극적으로 공시하는 방향으로 공시전략을 수정하게 되었음을 시사한다.

Abstract

This study investigates the association between firm specific information reflected in credit ratings and corporate disclosure behavior. To do so, we utilize the rating deviation, measured by the difference between actual rating and expected rating based on quantitative information, as a proxy for the extent of firm specific information while using stock price synchronicity as a measure of corporate disclosure reluctance. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, companies with larger value of rating deviations tend to exhibit higher levels of stock price synchronicity, suggesting that companies receiving higher(lower) credit rating than expected one have less(more) incentive to convey firm specific information to the market. Second, after the mandatory disclosure of stand-alone ratings, the previously observed positive association between rating deviations value and stock price synchronicity has diminished. This suggests that as stand-alone ratings are newly disclosed, companies with large value of rating deviations have adjusted their strategies towards actively disclosing firm-specific information to justify those deviations. This study offers policy implications by demonstrating that publicly disclosing detailed rating information contributes to alleviate information asymmetry between companies and investors.

Keywords:

Rating deviation, Stand-alone rating, Disclosure behavior, Stock price synchronicity

키워드:

신용등급 괴리값, 자체신용도 공시, 주가동조성

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∙ 저자 강동창은 현재 동양미래대학교 경영대학 세무회계학과 부교수로 재직 중이다. 서울대학교 경영대학 및 대학원 경영학과(석사)를 졸업하였으며, 현재 서강대학교에서 경영학 박사과정(회계전공) 중이다. 삼일회계법인 및 안진회계법인에서 회계사로 근무하였으며, 이후 한국신용평가에서 기업신용평가 업무를 담당하였다. 주요연구분야는 신용평가, 기업지배구조 및 공시제도 등이다.

∙ 저자 김정택은 서울대학교에서 경영학 학사 및 석사학위를, 고려대학교에서 경영학 박사학위를 각각 취득하였으며, 현재 단국대학교 경영학부 조교수로 재직 중이다. 주요 연구분야는 ESG, 회사채 신용평가, 회계감사이다.