Your browser does not support the PubReader view.
Go to this page to see a list of supporting browsers.
Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 45, No. 6, pp.1833-1857
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Dec 2016
Received 25 Feb 2016 Revised 03 Aug 2016 Accepted 15 Aug 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2016.45.6.1833

마중물 또는 눈먼 돈: 정부 연구개발 지원금이 연구개발 투자와 기업 혁신에 미치는 영향

최환석* ; 김양민**
*(주저자) 서강대학교 박사과정, 중소기업연구원 연구원 hschoi@kosbi.re.kr
**(교신저자) 서강대학교 경영대학 교수 ymkim@sogang.ac.kr
Too Much Support from the Government?: Government R&D Subsidies and their Impacts on R&D Investments and Firm Innovation
Hwanseok Choi* ; Yangmin Kim**
*Doctoral Student, Sogang Business School, Sogang University, First Author
**Professor, Sogang Business School, Sogang University, Corresponding Author

초록

본 연구는 대리인 이론에 기초하여 정부의 연구개발 지원이 개별 기업의 자체 연구개발 투자 및 혁신 성과에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 그리고 이러한 관계에 있어 재무적 여력이 미치는 조절효과에 대해서도 살펴보았다. 이를 위해 2010년부터 2012년까지 정부 연구개발 지원을 1회 이상 받은 약 5,800개의 상장 및 비상장 기업을 대상으로 분석을 시행하였다. 본 연구의 실증분석 결과, 정부의 연구개발 지원과 개별 기업의 자체 연구개발 투자 사이에 역 U자의 관계가 발견되었다. 또한 개별 기업의 총 연구개발 투자 내 정부 지원금 비중 역시 기업의 연구개발 성과와 역 U자형 관계를 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과들은 정부의 지원이 어느 수준까지는 기업의 연구개발을 촉진시키는 마중물의 역할을 하지만, 지나치게 많은 보조금은 오히려 도덕적 해이를 야기하여 기업의 혁신을 저해할 수 있다는 것을 의미한다. 마지막으로 개별 기업이 자체적으로 보유한 재무적 여력은 정부 지원금 비중과 특허, 논문 실적 등의 1차적 연구개발 성과 간에는 유의미한 영향을 미치지 않았지만, 사업화 실적으로 측정한 2차적 연구개발 성과 간에 대해서는 유의미한 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 이러한 결과를 바탕으로 시사점과 그 한계점에 대하여 논의하였다.

Abstract

Following Agency theory, this research examines government R&D subsidies and their impacts on R&D investment intensities and R&D performance, which is measured by such proxies as the number of patents obtained, the number of SCI papers published, and the number of commercializations. This paper also investigates how firm’s financial slack moderates the relationship between government R&D subsidies and R&D performance. To this end, hypotheses were developed and tested with an individual establishment level sample of approximately 5,800 Korean companies that have received R&D subsidy more than once from Korean government between 2010 and 2012. The results can be summarized as follows: (1) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government R&D subsidies and firm’s R&D intensities, (2) There also is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the proportion of government R&D subsidies to firm's total R&D expenditure and R&D performance, and (3) financial slack of a company moderates the effects of the proportion of government R&D subsidies to firm's total R&D expenditure on such R&D output as number of commercializations. The results suggest that there are positive effects of government subsidies on firm’s R&D intensities to some degree. Beyond certain points, however, government subsidies do not help firms increase their R&D intensities. Instead they decrease firm’s R&D intensities. In a similar manner, there are positive effects of government subsidies on firm’s innovation measured by number of patents obtained and number of commercializations. Beyond certain points, however, government subsidies do not help firms innovate. Instead they decrease firms’ outputs of innovation. This is particularly true in high- technology industries. The results suggest that too much of government R&D subsidies may not be beneficial for firms in terms of their own R&D efforts and innovation abilities. Theoretical contributions and practical implications of the study are discussed.

Keywords:

Government support, R&D investments, Innovation, Financial slack

키워드:

정부 지원, 연구개발 투자, 혁신, 재무적 여력

References

  • 고상원·권남훈·이경남(2005), 민간 IT 연구개발투자에 대한 정부보조금의 효과, 정보통신정책연구원.
  • 김현섭·송재용(2011), “기업 소유구조가 연구개발(R&D) 투자에 미치는 영향,” 전략경영연구, 14, 93-112.
  • 박지현·김양민(2012), “엇갈린 선택: 기관투자자의 유형과 연구개발(R&D) 투자,” 전략경영연구, 15(3), 19-42.
  • 박지현·김양민(2015), “최고경영자와 최고경영진의 특색이 연구개발 투자에 미치는 영향,” 전략경영연구, 18(2), 45-73.
  • 서정일·장호원(2010), “최고경영자(CEO), 최고 경영진(TMT), 기업 소유구조간의 상호작용이 R&D 투자에 미치는 영향,” 전략경영연구, 13, 29-49.
  • 양동우(2011), “정부의 R&D지원정도가 R&D성과에 미치는 영향에 관한 실증연구,” 대한경영학회지 춘계학술발표대회 발표논문집, 164-170.
  • 이호욱·박종훈·강소라(2006), “최고경영진의 구성, 보상구조 및 인접성이 연구개발 투자에 미치는 영향,” 인사조직연구, 14, 29-56.
  • 이희찬·한진영(2004), “전시관람수요의 결정요인: 절단된 가산자료모형의 적용,” 관광학연구, 28, 307-326.
  • 장금영(2010), “연구개발투자의 성과에 영향을 미치는 요인에 관한 연구: 정부의 산업기술개발사업을 중심으로,” 기술혁신연구, 18, 75-98.
  • Ahuja, G., and C. Lampert(2001), “Entrepreneurship in the Large Corporation: A Longitudinal Study of how Established Firms Create Breakthrough Inventions, Strategic Management Journal,” 22, 521-543. [https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.176]
  • Alam, P., and K. S. Walton(1995), “Information Asymmetry and Valuation Effects of Debt Financing,” The Financial Review, 30, 289-311. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.1995.tb00834.x]
  • Anton, J. J., and D. A. Yao(2002), “The Sale of Intellectual Property: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 69, 513-531. [https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.t01-1-00020]
  • Arrow, K. J.(1962), Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton Univ. Press, 609-626. [https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400879762-024]
  • Arrow, K. J.(1963), “Uncertainty and Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” American Economic Review, 53, 941-73.
  • Arslan-Ayaydin, O., D. Barnum, M. B. Karan, and H. Ozdemir(2014), “How is Moral Hazard Related to Financing R&D and Innovations?,” European Research Studies Journal, 17, 111-131. [https://doi.org/10.35808/ersj/435]
  • Baker, T., and R. E. Nelson(2005), “Creating Something from Nothing: Resource Construction through Entrepreneurial Bricolage,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 50, 329-366. [https://doi.org/10.2189/asqu.2005.50.3.329]
  • Barker, V. L., and G. C. Mueller(2002), “CEO Characteristics and Firm R&D Spending,” Management Science, 48, 782-801. [https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.6.782.187]
  • Bilter, M. P., T. J. Moskowitz, and A. Vissing-Jorgensen(2005), “Testing Agency Theory with Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth,” Journal of Finance, 90, 539-576. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00739.x]
  • Bourgeois, L.(1981), “On the Measurement of Organizational slack,” Academy of Management Review, 6, 29-39. [https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1981.4287985]
  • Branstetter, L., and M. Sakakibara(1998), “Japanese Research Consortia: A Microeconometric Analysis if Industrial Policy,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 46, 207-233. [https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00069]
  • Braun, D.(1993), “Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-agent Relations in Research Policymaking,” Journal of Public Policy, 13, 135-162. [https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00000994]
  • Brown, M. G., and R. A. Svensson(1998), “Measuring R&D Productivity,” Research-Technology Management, 41, 30-35.
  • Busom, I.(2000), “An Empirical Evaluation of the Effects of R&D Subsidies,” Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 9, 111-148. [https://doi.org/10.1080/10438590000000006]
  • Cameron, A. C., and P. K. Trivedi(1998), Regression Analysis of Count Data, Cambridge University Press. [https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814365]
  • Carpenter, R. E., and B. C. Petersen(2002), “Capital Market Imperfections, High-tech Investment, and New Equity Financing,” The Economic Journal, 112, F54-F72. [https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00683]
  • Coleman, J.(1990), Foundations of Social Theory, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
  • Cyert, R. M., and J. G. March(1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, NJ, Prentice Hall.
  • Czarnitzki, D., and K. Hussinger(2004), “The Link between R&D Subsidies, R&D Spending and Technological Performance,” ZEW-Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper, No. 04-56. [https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.575362]
  • Damanpour, F.(1987), “The Adoption of Technological, Administrative, and Ancillary Innovations: Impact of Organizational Factors,” Journal of Management, 13, 675-688. [https://doi.org/10.1177/014920638701300408]
  • David, P. A., B. H. Hall, and A. A. Toole(2000), “Is Public R&D a Complement or Substitute for Private R&D? A Review of the Econometric Evidence,” Research Policy, 29, 497-529. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(99)00087-6]
  • David, P., M. Hitt, and J. Gimeno(2001), “The Influence of Activism by Institutional Investors on R&D,” Academy of Management Journal, 44, 144-157. [https://doi.org/10.2307/3069342]
  • Fama, E., and M. C. Jensen(1983), “Separation of Ownership and Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325. [https://doi.org/10.1086/467037]
  • Fazzari, S., R. G. Hubbard, and B. C. Peterson (1988), “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 145-195. [https://doi.org/10.2307/2534426]
  • Garcia-Quevedo, I.(2004), “Do Public Subsidies Complement Business R&D? A Meta Analysis of the Econometric Evidence,” Kyklos, 57, 87-102. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0023-5962.2004.00244.x]
  • George, G.(2005), “Slack Resources and the Performance of Privately Held Firms,” Academy of Management Journal, 48, 661-676. [https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2005.17843944]
  • Gonzalez, X., and C. Pazo(2008), “Do Public Subsidies Stimulate Private R&D Spending?,” Research Policy, 37, 371-389. [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.10.009]
  • Greve, H.(2003), “A Behavioral Theory of R&D Expenditures and Innovations: Evidence from Shipbuilding,” Academy of Management Journal, 46, 685-702. [https://doi.org/10.2307/30040661]
  • Greve, H.(2003), Organizational Learning from Performance Feedback: A Behavioral Perspective on Innovation and Change, Cambridge University Press: UK. [https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615139]
  • Griliches, Z.(1986), “Productivity, R&D and Basic Research at the Firm Level in the 1970’s,” American Economic Review, 76, 141-154. [https://doi.org/10.3386/w1547]
  • Guston, D. H.(1996), “Principal-agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy,” Science and Public Policy, 23, 229-240.
  • Hall, B.(1992), Investment and Research and Development at the Firm Level: Does the Source of Financing Matter?, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4096. [https://doi.org/10.3386/w4096]
  • Hall, B.(2002), “The Financing of Research and Development,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18, 35-51.
  • Hamberg, D.(1966), R&D: Essays in the Economics of Research and Development, Random House, New York.
  • Hansen, G. S., and C. W. L. Hill(1991), “Are Institutional Investors Myopic? A Time-series Study of Four Technology Driven Industries,” Strategic Management Journal, 12, 1-16. [https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250120102]
  • Higgins, R. S., and A. N. Link(1981), “Federal Support of Technological Growth in Industry: Some Evidence of Crowding Out,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, EM-28, 86-88. [https://doi.org/10.1109/TEM.1981.6447450]
  • Hill, C., and S. Snell(1989), “Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity,” Academy of Management Journal, 32, 25-46. [https://doi.org/10.2307/256418]
  • Hill, M. D., G. B. Lockhart, and E. Unlu(2013), “Corporate Lobbying, High-risk Investment, and Agency Costs of Debt,” Working Paper, SSRN eLibrary
  • Himmelberg, C., and B. Petersen(1994), “R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel Study of Small Firms in High-tech Industries,” Review of Economic Statistics, 76, 38-51. [https://doi.org/10.2307/2109824]
  • Hitt, M., R. Hoskisson, and H. Kim(1997), “International Diversification: Effects on Innovation and Firm Performance in Productdiversified Firms,” Academy of Management Journal, 40, 767-798. [https://doi.org/10.2307/256948]
  • Jaffee, D., and J. Stiglitz(1990), Credit Rationing, In Benjamin M. Friedman and Frank H. Hahn (Eds.), Handbook of Momentary Economics, 2, 838-888. New York: North-Holland.
  • Jensen, M. C.(1986), “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,” American Economic Review, 76, 323-329.
  • Jensen, M. C.(1989), “Eclipse of the Public Corporation,” Harvard Business Review, 67, 61-74.
  • Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling(1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X]
  • Johnson, S. A.(2003), “Debt Maturity and the Effects of Growth Opportunities and Liquidity Risk on Leverage,” Review of Financial Studies, 16, 209-236. [https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/16.1.0209]
  • Kaplan, S. N., and P. Stromberg(2002), “Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,” The Review of Economic Studies, 70, 281-315. [https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00245]
  • Kennedy, P.(1998), A Guide to Econometrics, Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Kim, H., Kim, H., and Peggy M. Lee(2008), “Ownership Structure and the Relationship between Financial Slack and R&D Investments: Evidence from Korean Firms,” Organization Science, 19, 404-418. [https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1080.0360]
  • Lichtenberg, F. R.(1984), “The Relationship between Federal Contract R&D and Company R&D,” American Economic Review, 74, 73-78.
  • Mahmood, I., and W. Mitchell(2004), “Two Faces: Effects of Business Groups on Innovation in Emerging Economies,” Management Science, 50, 1348-1365. [https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0259]
  • March, J. G.(1991), “Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,” Organization Science, 2, 71-87. [https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2.1.71]
  • Medda, G., and C. A. Piga(2007), “Technological Spillovers and Productivity in Italian Manufacturing Firms,” Journal of Productivity Analysis, 41, 419-434. [https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-013-0351-1]
  • Mishina, Y., Pollack, T., and Porac, J.(2004), “Are More Resources Always Better for Growth? Resource Stickiness in Product and Market Expansion,” Strategic Management Journal, 25, 1179-1197. [https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.424]
  • O’Brien, J. P.(2003), “The Capital Structure Implications of Pursuing a Strategy of Innovation,” Strategic Management Journal, 24, 415-431. [https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.308]
  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(2015), OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Scoreboard 2015, OECD.
  • Penrose, E. T.(1959), The Theory of Growth of the Firm, Blackwell: Oxford, U.K.
  • Sayrs, L. W.(1989), Pooled Time Series Analysis, Sage Publications, Inc. [https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412985420]
  • Singh, J.(1986), “Performance, Slack, and Risk Taking in Organizational Decision Making,” Academy of Management Journal, 29, 562-585. [https://doi.org/10.5465/256224]
  • Stiglitz, J.(1998), Economics of Public Sector, 2d ed, New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
  • Svensson, R.(2011), “Publicly-funded R&D Programs and Survival of Patents,” Applied Economics, 45, 1343-1358. [https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2011.617700]
  • Teece, D.(1986), “Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy,” Research Policy, 15, 285-305. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(86)90027-2]
  • Van der Meulen, B. J. R.(1998), “Science Policies as Principal-agent Games: Institutionalization and Path-dependency in the Relation between Government and Science,” Research Policy, 27, 757-769. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(98)00049-3]
  • Wallsten, S. J.(2000), “Do Government-industry R&D Programs Increase Private R&D?: The Case of the Small Business Innovation Research Program,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 82-100. [https://doi.org/10.2307/2601030]
  • Wieser, R.(2005), “Research and Development Productivity and Spillovers: Empirical Evidence at the Firm Level,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 19: 587-621. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00260.x]
  • Wooldridge, J. M.(2008), Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, Mason, OH: South-Western.
  • Zantout, Z. Z.(1997), “A Test of the Debt-monitoring Hypothesis: The Case of Corporate R&D Expenditures,” The Financial Review, 32, 21-48. [https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.1997.tb00413.x]
  • Zajac, E. J., and J. D. Westphal(1994), “The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More Not Better?,” Strategic Management Journal, 15, 121-142. [https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250150909]

∙저자 최환석은 현재 서강대학교 박사과정에 재학 중이며, 중소기업연구원에서 연구원으로 일하고 있다. 고려대학교 경영학과를 졸업하고, 美 조지워싱턴대학교에서 통계학 석사를 취득하였다. 前 지식경제부에서 전문관으로 일하였으며, 이후 중소기업연구원으로 옮겨 관련 이슈들에 대한 연구를 지속적으로 수행하고 있다. 주요 관심분야는 기업 혁신과 성장, 시너지 창출, 글로벌 경쟁, 기업 지배구조 등이다.

∙저자 김양민은 현재 서강대학교 경영대학 교수이며 미국 Marquette University 경영대학 조교수, University of Southern California 경영대학 방문교수를 역임하였다. Texas A&M대학교에서 경영학 박사학위를 취득하였고, 주요 관심분야는 전략적 리더십, 기업지배구조, 창업CEO의 특성, 기업혁신과 CEO승계 등이다. 전략경영학회의 상임이사, 인사조직학회의 상임이사 등을 역임하였다.