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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 45, No. 2, pp.465-502
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Apr 2016
Received 12 Apr 2015 Revised 11 Sep 2015 Accepted 20 Jan 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2016.45.2.465

상품시장에서의 경쟁, 소유-지배 괴리도와 이사회 특성

이지혜* ; 변희섭**
*(주저자) 고려대학교 경영대학 경영학과 연구교수 jihye.lee.kr@gmail.com
**(교신저자) 한림대학교 경영대학 재무금융학과 조교수 heesbyun@hallym.ac.kr
Product Market Competition, Ownership-Control Disparity, and Board Characteristics
Ji Hye Lee* ; Hee Sub Byun**
*Research Professor, Department of Business Administration, Business School, Korea University, First Author
**Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, College of Business, Hallym University, Corresponding Author

초록

본 연구는 지배주주의 사적효용추구 유인을 대리하는 소유-지배 괴리도가 이사회 특성에 미치는 영향력이 상품시장에서의 경쟁 위협에 의해 어떻게 달라지는가를 분석한다. 실증분석결과, 소유-지배 괴리도의 상승은 이사회의 감시기능을 약화시키는 것으로 관찰되어 기존 연구의 주장을 재차 확인할 수 있었다. 하지만 이러한 영향력은 비경쟁적인 상품시장에서 주로 강하게 관찰되었으며, 경쟁적인 상품시장에서는 사라지거나 약화되는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 상품시장에서의 경쟁 위협이 사적효용추구 행태를 사전에 규율함에 따라, 지배주주가 과도한 통제권을 바탕으로 이사회의 감시기능을 약화시킬 유인을 감소시키기 때문으로 해석이 가능하다. 이러한 관계는 내생성 문제를 완화시킨 경우, 대안적인 상품시장에서의 경쟁 지수를 활용한 경우, 이사회의 감시기능에 대한 보다 구체적이며 포괄적인 지수를 사용한 경우에도 유사하게 관찰되어 강건성을 확인할 수 있었다. 한편, 추가적으로 상품시장에서의 경쟁과 소유-지배 괴리도의 상호관계가 경영권 방어 조항 채택 여부에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과에서도 동일한 효과가 관찰되었다.

본 연구의 결과는 국내 자본시장에서 상품시장에서의 경쟁 위협이 지배주주의 사적효용 추구 유인에 기인한 이사회의 감시기능을 약화시키려는 행태를 사전에 규율하는 효과적인 통제장치로 이해될 수 있음을 시사한다. 따라서 본 연구는 대리인문제의 규율이 주로 내부 지배구조에 의존하는 국내 자본시장에서 어떤 방식을 통해 효율적으로 이사회의 감시기능을 제고시킬 수 있는지에 대한 시사점을 제시할 것으로 판단된다.

Abstract

This paper investigates how the effect of ownership disparity of controlling shareholders on board monitoring is influenced by the competitive threat in product markets. Empirically, we confirm that the ownership disparity has significantly negative effect on the board monitoring as presented in previous literatures. However, this effect is strongly observed in less competitive product markets, while decreases or disappears in more competitive product markets. We can interpret this result as disciplinary effect of the competitive threat: as controlling shareholders' incentive to persue private benefit of control is mitigated by the competitive threat, they would not undermine the board monitoring. This effect is robust to control for endogeneity problem, and to alternative measures of product market competition and board monitoring. Additionally, using the adoption of anti-takeover provisions as a dependent variable, the disciplinary effect of the competitive threat is consistently observed.

Extending the previous studies (Karuna, 2007, 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011), we examine the effect of interaction between product market competition and internal corporate governance on the board monitoring in Korean economy. Yet, in the process, we are the first who focus on the controlling shareholders’ ownership disparity between cash flow rights and control rights which is rarely observed in developed countries. By focusing on that, we provide new hypotheses which are suitable for Korean market. The assumption that internal corporate governance is formed by being affected by one particular factor is very restricted and hard to generalize. It is formed by being influenced by interactions among various internal firm characteristics and external environmental factors. Therefore, we provide generalized hypotheses and academic implications by considering the ownership disparity as well as the product market competition.

The results of this paper provide a critical political implications as well. In the Korean economy, the discipline on the agency problem is dependent mainly on the board monitoring, due to the weakness and inefficiency of other external control mechanisms such as market for corporate control and corporate managerial market. However, the regulations on the corporate governance should minimize the social and economic costs and maximize the benefit from it at the same time. In this context, the results of this paper imply that the regulations should be made by considering market structure: regulations that force intensive board monitoring should be focused more on the firms in less competitive industries. In addition, our results imply that the competitive threat could be regarded as an effective control device which could substitute the other external control mechanisms to diminish the agency problems.

Keywords:

Product market competition, Ownership-control disparity, Private benefit, Board monitoring, Anti-takeover provision

키워드:

상품시장에서의 경쟁, 소유-지배 괴리도, 사적효용추구, 이사회의 감시기능, 경영권 방어 조항

Acknowledgments

이 논문은 2015년도 한림대학교 교비연구비(HRF-201503-001)에 의하여 연구되었음.This research was supported by Hallym University Research Fund, 2015 (HRF-201503-001).

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·저자 이지혜는 현재 고려대학교 경영대학 연구교수로 재직중이다. 고려대학교 경영대학에서 재무론 전공으로 박사학위를 취득하였으며, 박사 학위 후에는 고려대학교 부설 기업지배구조연구소 연구원, 고려대학교 경영대학 강사, 서울시립대학교 경영대학 강사로 재직하였다. 주요 연구 분야는 대리인이론, 외부 경영통제장치(상품시장에서의 경쟁, 기업경영권시장 등)의 효율성 등이다.

·저자 변희섭은 현재 한림대학교 경영대학 재무금융학과 조교수로 재직중이다. 고려대학교 경영대학에서 재무론 전공으로 박사학위를 취득하였으며, 박사 학위 후에는 서울시립대학교 경영대학 강사, 예금보험공사 연구위원으로 재직하였다. 주요 연구 분야로 기업지배구조이론, 기업의 사회적 책임 활동 전략, 금융기관의 경영전략 등이다.