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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 46, No. 4, pp.1127-1155
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Aug 2017
Received 06 Jan 2017 Revised 06 May 2017 Accepted 28 Jun 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2017.46.4.1127

국내기업의 CSR활동은 투자인가 비용인가?

류두원* ; 류두진** ; 황준호***
*(주저자) 성균관대학교 경제학과 초빙교수 lyucreon@skku.edu
**(교신저자) 성균관대학교 경제학과 교수 sharpjin@skku.edu
***(공저자) 고려대학교 경영대학 교수 joonhwang@korea.ac.kr
Corporate Social Responsibility: Investment or Expense?
Doowon Ryu* ; Doojin Ryu** ; Joonho Hwang***
*Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University Seoul, Korea, First Author
**Professor, Department of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea, Corresponding Author
***Professor, Business School, Korea University, Seoul, Korea, Co-Author

초록

기업의 사회적 책임(CSR)에 대한 이론 및 실증연구가, CSR가치상승이론과 CSR비용이론으로 대립하여 제시 및 설명되고 있는 가운데, 본 연구는 대리인이론을 바탕으로 제품시장경쟁과 R&D 투자가 CSR에 미치는 영향을 분석하여 국내기업의 CSR활동의 성격에 대하여 명확히 밝히고자 한다. 2009년 1월부터 2015년 12월까지의 한국거래소에 상장된 KOSPI 기업을 대상으로 실증분석을 실시한 결과, 제품시장경쟁은 CSR활동에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타나 가치상승이론을 지지하는 결과를, R&D 투자는 CSR에 유의한 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타나 비용이론을 지지하는 결과를 보였다. 또한, 대리인문제의 대용변수로 사용되는 장부부채비율과 잉여현금흐름변수가 CSR에 미치는 영향에 대해서는 비용이론을 지지하는 결과가 나타났다, 이러한 실증분석 결과는 국내기업의 CSR활동의 성격은 가치상승과 비용의 측면을 모두 가지고 있으나, 가치상승보다는 비용 측면의 성격이 상대적으로 크게 작용하고 있음을 암시한다.

Abstract

Recently, corporate social responsibility (hereafter, CSR) of firms has become an important topic in all fields of business. The topic takes a greater importance in Korea which has accomplished rapid economic growth mostly from large companies. There are two opposing views, both theoretically and empirically, on the role of CSR. The first is the value-enhancing view of CSR, which argues that CSR activity is a positive NPV investment thus increasing firm value. A possible channel for this role of CSR is that so long as CSR promotes wealth increase of some stakeholders, these stakeholders will support the firm’s other business activities and contribute to the firm’s performance. The other view is the expense view of CSR, which argues that CSR is a manifestation of an agency problem and thus hurts firm value and shareholders’ wealth. Based on the expense view of CSR, managers can exploit CSR at the expense of shareholders in order to gain good reputation from other stakeholders.

Based on these two opposing views of CSR, this study empirically examines the CSR activities of Korean firms in relationship to the degree of product market competition and the amount of R&D investment. As a proxy of CSR activity, we use the KEJI index provided by CCEJ as the dependent variable. Other main variables of this study are HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) to measure the degree of product market competition, and the amount of R&D investment, leverage and free cash flow of firms. Using firms listed in the Korea Exchange and those that are in the manufacturing industry, we perform various regression analyses including the Fama-MacBeth cross sectional regressions. The sample period of the study is between January, 2009 and December, 2015.

Our main results of the empirical analyses are as follows. First, the degree of product market competition has a positive impact on the amount of CSR activities. This result supports the value-enhancing view of CSR. Second, the size of R&D investment also has a positive effect on the amount of CSR activities. This result supports the expense view of CSR. Third, the result with respect to the leverage and free cash flow variables, which are proxies of agency cost, is consistent with the expense view of CSR. Overall, results are more supportive of the expense view of CSR compared with the value-enhancing view of CSR. This implies that the CSR activies of Korea firms can be another showing of agency problem.

Keywords:

Corporate Social responsibility, Agency Problem, Product Market Competition, R&D Investment

키워드:

기업의 사회적 책임, 대리인문제, 제품시장경쟁, R&D 투자

Acknowledgments

이 논문은 2016년도 성균관대학교 박사후 교내 연수지원 사업에 의하여 연구되었음.This work was supported by the Postdoctoral Research Program of Sungkyunkwan University(2016)

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• 저자 류두원은 현재 성균관대학교 경제학과 초빙교수로 재직 중이다. 성균관대학교 대학원(MS in management)에서 석사학위를 취득하고, 중앙대학교 경제학과(경제정책 전공), 고려대학교 경영학과(재무 전공) 박사과정을 각각 수료하였다. 한국외국어대학교 국제경영학과(국제경영 전공)에서 경영학박사학위를 취득하였다. 주요연구분야 및 관심분야는 기업재무, 전략, 시장경쟁, CSR 등이다.

• 저자 류두진은 서울대학교 전기공학부를 졸업하고 KAIST 경영대학에서 Finance를 전공하여 박사학위를 취득하였다. 국민연금공단 부연구위원, 한국외국어대학교 조교수, 중앙대학교 조교수를 거쳐 현재 성균관대학교 경제학과 정년보장 부교수로 재직 중이다. Investment Analysts Journal (SSCI)의 Editor이고 Emerging Markets Review (SSCI)의 Associate Editor이다. 연구분야는 Finance 전분야와 융합연구를 포함하며, 현재까지 62편의 SSCI논문과 7편의 SCI논문을 작성하였다.

• 저자 황준호는 현재 고려대학교 경영대학 재무금융 전공 부교수로 재직 중이다. KAIST 산업경영학과 학부 및 대학원 경영공학과를 졸업하였으며, 미국 인디애나대학교에서 경영학박사를 취득하였다. 박사학위 취득 이후에는 멤피스 대학교에서 조교수로 일하였다. 주요연구분야는 기업재무, 시장효율성, 행태재무학 등이다.