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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 46, No. 3, pp.625-662
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Jun 2017
Received 26 Dec 2016 Accepted 13 Feb 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2017.46.3.625

기업지배구조 연구의 고찰과 향후 국내관련 연구의 방향

박경서*
*(주저자) 고려대학교 경영학과 kspark@korea.ac.kr
Review of Corporate Governance Research and its Implications for Korea
Kyung Suh Park*
*Korea University Business School

초록

본 보고서는 그동안 국내외에서 진행되어 온 기업지배구조(corporate governance) 관련 주요연구결과를 정리하고, 국내기업의 관점에서 향후 검토되어야 할 연구주제의 방향에 대해 논의하고 있다. 선진국과 달리 대다수 상장기업에 개인지배주주가 존재하는 한국적 상황에서 내부자에 의한 사익추구의 다양한 형태와 이에 대한 규율장치의 작동여부에 대한 연구는 향후 국내기업의 지배구조관련 연구의 심화와 관련제도의 개선을 위해 매우 중요할 것이다.

Abstract

This paper reviews existing research on corporate governance to provide a future direction for research on the corporate governance of Korean companies, which is characterized by concentrated ownership where the pursuit of the private benefit of control by controlling shareholders is not properly regulated.

Early research on corporate governance focused on the theoretical backgrounds of the conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers, and Jensen and Meckling(1976) provides a seminal paper that shows less than 100% ownership by entrepreneurs renders them to pursue their own private interests as the costs of such diversion will be shared with other shareholders while the benefit is solely enjoyed by the entrepreneurs. Many empirical studies have confirmed that managers tend to diverge corporate resources, examples including over-investments and empire building, low level of cash payout policy and free cash flow, tunneling through related party transactions, usurption of business opportunities, hiring family members and relatives of dubious qualification, issuing securities at deep discounts to family members, inappropriate remuneration, etc. In addition to the partial ownership by controlling shareholders, an other line of studies have also confirmed that the disparity between their cash-flow rights and control rights is negatively related with firm values. They show that small ownership itself is not an issue, but the disparity matters since it can entrench managers while their economic interests are not aligned with other shareholders.

Holmstrom(1979) and following papers focus on information asymmetry as another source of moral hazard on the part of managers who takes advantage of their superior position in the management of their firms, and maximizes their own interests at the expense of shareholders if they are not properly incentivized or monitored. The issue of information asymmetry accordingly rendered corporate governance research to focus on monitoring mechanisms that are supposedly to enhance the transparency and accountability of firms. Most importantly, the boards of directors are found to play a key role in regulating inappropriate behavior of managers, and numerous empirical studies have confirmed that the level of the independence and expertise of non-executive directors are positively correlated with firm values and performances. Studies on managerial compensation schemes including tenure termination also show that they are mostly aligned with the interests of shareholders as a regulating mechanism even though there exist cases where opportunism by managers can influence the decision process.

Corporate governance research on Korean firms has its own advantage since the Korean economy is characterized by business groups, Chaebols, and their ownership structures and managerial behaviors provide ample cases for interesting analyses. Tunneling is a typical phenomenon observed among affiliated firms belonging to a business group where corporate resources of listed firms are diverted to firms mostly owned by controlling families. Research on the diverse cases of diversion by corporate insiders and on the failure of monitoring mechanisms deserve further studies in Korea, which will shed more light on the incentives of corporate insiders in an emerging economy where its legal system does not properly penalize the misconducts of corporate insiders, contributing to the area of corporate governance research, and also to the improvement of the corporate governance of Korean companies.

Keywords:

Corporate Governance, Controlling Shareholders, Private Benefit of Control, Conflicts of Interests, Monitoring Mechanisms

키워드:

기업지배구조, 지배주주, 사익추구, 이해상충문제, 경영감시장치

Acknowledgments

저자는 고려대학교 경영대학 및 아시아기업지배구조연구소의 연구 지원에 대해 감사한다.

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• 저자 박경서는 현재 고려대학교 경영대학 재무금융 전공 조교수로 재직 중이다. 고려대학교 경영학과를 졸업하였으며, 미국 스탠포드대학에서 MBA, 노스웨스턴대학 경영대학원에서 Finance 분야로 박사학위를 취득하였다. 고려대학교로 부임하기 전 한국금융연구원에서 연구위원으로 근무하였으며 2013년부터 3년간 한국기업지배구조원 원장을 역임한 바 있다. 주된 연구분야는 기업재무, 미시구조론, 금융기관론, 기업지배구조론 등이다.