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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 46, No. 2, pp.375-401
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Apr 2017
Received 28 Jul 2016 Revised 15 Jan 2017 Accepted 23 Jan 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2017.46.2.375

Asset Embezzlement and CEO Characteristics

Ha-yeon Park* ; A-young Lee** ; Sung-bin Chun***
*(First Author) Sogang University hyp21@sogang.ac.kr
**(Corresponding Author) Kangwon National University aayoungg@kangwon.ac.kr
***(Co-Author) Sogang University youngwha@sogang.ac.kr
자산횡령과 경영자 특성
박하연* ; 이아영** ; 전성빈***
*서강대학교, 주저자
**강원대학교, 교신저자
***서강대학교, 공저자

Abstract

This study presents empirical evidence to answer the following question: “Which factors of CEO characteristics can affect the CEO’s decision-making or actions on embezzlement?” CEOs may be the key wrongdoers of fraud in asset embezzlement, it is important to understand the relationship between embezzlement and the characteristics of the CEOs involved in it. We analyze the association between embezzlement by CEO and CEO characteristics, represented by ownership status and demographic variables (age and major), by examining cases of CEO embezzlement in the Korean capital market. Although previous accounting studies on fraud are rarely taken into consideration in embezzlement cases, this study focuses on this cases using a sample of 490 firm-year observations during the period from 2005 to 2012.

The major findings of this study are as follows. First, owner CEOs are less likely to commit embezzlement compared to non-owner CEOs. The incidence of CEO asset embezzlement tends to decrease when the CEO is a major shareholder of the company. Second, we find a significantly negative association between the CEO’s age and embezzlement, suggesting that older CEOs are less likely to embezzle corporate assets. Meanwhile, no significant relationship is found between the CEO’s major and asset embezzlement.

Therefore, this study suggest that CEOs’ ownership status and demographic characteristics can systematically explain the occurrence of corporate fraud. Understanding the characteristics of the CEOs who are prone to embezzlement may help shareholders and boards of directors recognize red flags and guard against fraudulent CEOs in the market for corporate control.

초록

본 연구는 기업부정(fraud)과 기업부정의 직접적인 관여자라고 할 수 있는 경영자 특성간의 관계를 기업횡령 사건을 중심으로 살펴보고자 한다. 기업부정은 개인의 부를 증진시키기 위하여 자신의 직위를 이용함으로써 기업의 자원 및 자산을 의도적으로 오용하거나 유용하는 것을 말한다(ACFE, 2009). 그동안의 기업부정 사건과 관련한 선행연구는 다양하게 진행되어 왔지만 기업부정의 핵심적 주체가 될 수 있는 경영자에 대한 고려가 없으며, 본 연구는 기업부정관련 사건 중 2005년에서 2012년 사이에 발생한 자산횡령을 중심으로 살펴보았다. 기업 횡령사건의 상당부분을 경영자가 관여하고 있다는 점에서 횡령의 주체인 경영자와 횡령의 관련성을 살펴 볼 필요가 있다.

그렇다면 경영자의 의사결정이나 행위에 영향을 줄 수 있는 요인이 무엇이며, 이러한 요인들이 횡령을 체계적으로 설명할 수 있는가?라는 문제에 본 연구는 실증적 증거를 제시하고자 한다.

본 연구의 실증결과, 먼저, 소유경영자가 전문경영자들에 비해 횡령을 저지를 가능성이 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 다음으로, 경영자의 나이와 자산횡령과 관련이 있는지를 분석한 결과, 경영자의 나이가 많을수록 자산횡령을 덜 하는 것으로 나타났다. 한편 경영자가 경영학을 전공했는지의 여부와 자산횡령 간에는 유의한 관계를 발견하지 못하였다.

학문적으로 본 연구는 기업부정의 핵심적 주체가 될 수 있는 경영자에 중점을 두고, 경영자의 경제적 유인과 관련이 있는 소유·전문 경영자 여부와 경영자 개인의 특유(idiosyncratic)하고 비경제적인(noneconomic) 인구통계학적 변수가 기업부정을 체계적으로 설명할 수 있는 변수가 될 수 있는지를 파악했다는 점에서 의미가 있을 것이다. 횡령의 발생가능성과 관련이 있는 경영자의 특성을 관찰하는 것은 실무적으로도 기업경영권시장에 도움이 될 수 있을 것으로 기대한다.

Keywords:

Asset embezzlement, CEO characteristics

키워드:

자산횡령, 경영자 특성

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF-2015S1A5A2A01011621)이 논문은 2015년 대한민국 교육부와 한국연구재단의 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임(NRF-2015S1A5A2A01011621).

This study was supported by 2016 Research Grant from Kangwon National University(No. 520160443)이 논문은 2016년도 강원대학교 대학회계 학술연구조성비로 연구하였음(관리번호-520160443).

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• 저자 박하연은 현재 서강대학교 경영대학 대우교수이다. 서강대학교에서 수학/경영을 전공하였으며, 동 대학의 경영전문대학원에서 석사(금융전공) 및 박사(회계학 전공)를 취득하였다. 주요연구분야는 기업부정, 기업 공시, 회계투명성, 이익조정, 기업지배구조 등이다.

• 저자 이아영은 현재 강원대학교 경영대학 회계학과의 재무회계 전공 부교수로 재직 중이다. 서강대학교 사회과학부를 졸업하였으며, 동 대학의 대학원에서 경영학석사 및 박사학위(회계학 전공)를 취득하였다. 주요 연구분야는 기업의 투명성 및 성과평가, 기업 공시, 이익조정 등이다.

• 저자 전성빈은 현재 서강대학교 경영대학 회계 전공 교수로 재직 중이다. 서강대학교 영문학과를 졸업하였으며, University of California, Berkeley에서 회계전공 박사학위를 취득하였다. 저자는 주로 공시, 회계투명성, IFRS을 세부전공으로 연구하고 있다.