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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 47, No. 5, pp.1201-1230
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Oct 2018
Received 13 Feb 2018 Revised 07 Jul 2018 Accepted 07 Sep 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2018.47.5.1201

경영자의 과신성향과 주가정보성: 미래이익반응계수와 주가동조성을 중심으로

이혜미* ; 홍창목**
*(주저자) 국민대학교 회계학과 박사과정 84ham@kookmin.ac.kr
**(교신저자) 국민대학교 회계학과 cmhong@kookmin.ac.kr
Management Overconfidence and Stock Price Informativeness
HyeMi Lee* ; ChangMok Hong**
*Kookmin University, First Author
**Kookmin University, Corresponding Author

초록

본 논문은 경영자의 과신성향이 주가정보성에 차별적인 영향력을 미치는지를 미래이익반응계수와 주가동조성을 통하여 실증 분석하였다. 만약 과신 경영자가 이끄는 기업이 재무보고를 왜곡하는 등 정보 공시를 악화시킨다면 상대적으로 주가동조성 수준은 높고, 미래이익반응계수는 낮을 것이다. 반면, 과신 경영자 기업일수록 투자자들이 미래 전망을 용이하게 평가할 수 있도록 공시수준이 높아지고, 장기투자프로젝트를 확고히 수행한다는 신호를 시장에 보낸다면 주가정보성은 향상될 것이다.

실증분석은 2003년부터 2015년까지 유가증권시장 및 코스닥시장의 12월 결산 비금융 상장법인들을 대상으로 수행되었다. 결과를 살펴보면 첫째, 경영자가 과신성향을 보이는 기업들은 그렇지 않은 기업들에 비하여 미래이익반응계수가 유의적으로 더 높았다. 둘째, 경영자의 과신성향은 주가동조성과 유의적인 음(-)의 연관성을 보였다. 즉, 과신 경영자가 있는 기업일수록 주가정보성이 향상된다는 일관된 연구결과를 미래이익반응계수와 주가동조성모형을 통하여 얻었다.

본 논문은 경영자의 과신성향이 주가정보성을 향상시킬 수 있다는 가능성을 시사하는 증거를 제시함으로써 경영자 과신의 정보적 역할에 대한 연구 분야에 기여할 것으로 생각된다. 또한 선행연구들은 대부분 미래이익반응계수의 횡단면 결정요인으로 기업의 경제적 특성에 관심을 두었다면, 본 연구는 경영자의 특성인 과신성향이 미래이익반응계수의 결정요인이 될 수 있다는 추가적인 증거를 제시하였다는 공헌점을 갖는다.

Abstract

Most of prior studies on management overconfidence have reported that overconfident managers have negative impacts on the firm. However, there are some studies claiming that there is no evidence that overconfident managers undermine corporate value, instead, they achieve innovative success by boldly investing in innovation. This paper plans to examine the effect of overconfident management on the firm information environment and try to find out the benefits of overconfident management. Prior studies have reported two opposite directions on the effect of overconfident management on the corporate information environment. Overconfident managers may distort financial reporting and/or conservative accounting tends to weaken if earnings forecast becomes difficult to achieve or investment returns fall short of expectations. But there are studies which claimed that overconfident management can improve the information environment; these managers are more inclined to voluntarily disclose and provide specific earnings forecast. Kramer and Liao (2016), who carried out direct studies on the association between overconfident management and financial analysts' forecast properties, reported that financial analysts' earnings forecast accuracy is higher and forecast dispersion is smaller in overconfident management companies. Wei and Zhang (2016) analyzed the information role of overconfident managers in terms of mitigating information asymmetry among investors and found that financial analysts' earnings forecast dispersion is small, broader investor base is formed and information asymmetry between investors is mitigated.

This paper plans to empirically examine the informational role of overconfident managers in terms of stock price informativeness. Stock price informativeness is often measured as a future earnings response coefficient(FERC) or stock price synchronicity. If overconfident magement weakens information disclosure, for example, distorting or obscuring the financial information too much, then investors may not have enough information to predict the firm's future prospects and place a little weight on the corporate information in forming a future profit expectation. In this case, it is expected that overconfident management have relatively high stock price synchronicity level and low FERC. On the other hand, overconfident management have strong willingness to disclose voluntarily, conduct the accounting with which the investors are able to easily evaluate future prospects and send a signal to the market that they are firmly carrying out long-term investment projects to make the investors collect more firm-specific information. In this case, there exists a possibility that stock price informativeness will be improved.

This paper empirically analyzed the effect of management's overconfidence on FERC and stock price synchronicity of the non-financial companies listed on KOSPI and KOSDAQ market between 2004 and 2015. This paper used the measurement of overconfident management of Schrand and Zechman (2012). FERC was estimated using a standard model used in the field of accounting, and the stock price synchronicity was measured relying on Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). For the robustness of the results, double clustering at the company and year level and control of the company fixing effect were conducted to estimate the standard error of the regression coefficient. As a result of the analysis, it was found that the companies with overconfident management have an incremental increase in FERC and a lower stock price synchronicity. This implies that the more overconfident management is, the more likely to use value-relevant firm-specific information in the market.

This study contributes in the following aspects. First, it shows that the effect of overconfident management in the information environment could be a benefit to the company. Second, they have tried to explain the relationship between the stock price and earnings in the accounting field and FERC is suggested as a factor to improve the explanatory power of this relationship. Studies that identified cross-sectional determinants of FERC have focused mainly on the economic characteristics of companies, such as size and growth. However, this study is considered to contribute to the research field of FERC as well as the research field that claims that the characteristics of manager give effects on the corporate information environment by presenting an evidence that the overconfident management also can be an important determinant of the firm information environment.

Keywords:

management overconfidence, stock price, informativeness, synchronicity, ferc

키워드:

경영자 과신, 주가정보성, 미래이익반응계수, 주가동조성

Acknowledgments

본 연구는 국민대학교 교내학술연구비의 지원을 받아 수행되었습니다.

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• 저자 이혜미는 현재 국민대학교 회계학과 박사과정에 재학 중이다. 명지대학교 인문대학에서 학사를 취득하였으며, 이후 국민대학교에서 회계학석사를 취득하였다. 현재에는 국민대학교 회계학과 박사과정에 재학 중이다. 주요관심분야는 회계정보투명성 및 자본비용 등이다.

• 저자 홍창목은 현재 국민대학교 경영대학 회계학 교수로 재직 중이다. 서울대학교 경영대학에서 학사 및 KAIST에서 산업공학 석사를 취득하였다. 미국 University of Texas at Austin에서 회계학 박사를 취득하였다. 박사학위 취득 이후 현재까지 국민대학교 경영대학 회계학 교수로 재직 중이다. 주요 연구분야는 재무회계 및 회계감사 등이다.