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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 48, No. 6, pp.1625-1641
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Dec 2019
Received 24 Sep 2019 Accepted 31 Oct 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2019.48.6.1625

온라인 쇼핑 웹사이트에서 판매수수료와 제품가격을 어떻게 그리고 누가 결정하는 것이 좋을까?

박해철* ; 현지윤**
*(주저자, 교신저자) 중앙대학교 경영학부 교수 hpark@cau.ac.kr
**(공저자) 중앙대학교 대학원 경영학과 iamsamh@hanmail.net
How Should They Set Their Seller Fee Schedule and Who Set Their Product Prices for Online Shopping Websites?
Haechurl Park* ; Ji Yoon Hyun**
*Professor, School of Business Administration, Chung-Ang University, First Author, Corresponding Author
**Department of Business Administration, Chung-Ang University Graduate School, Co-Author

초록

온라인 쇼핑 웹사이트와 공급업체들로 이루어진 공급사슬에서 업체들은 각자의 이익을 최대화하고자 하는 다른 유인체계를 가지고 있기 때문에, 판매수수료를 변수로 하여 서로 상이한 소매가격을 희망하게 된다. 본 연구에서는 이러한 문제를 해결하고 각 업체들의 이익을 최대화하는 판매수수료를 비롯한 거래모형을 도출하기 위하여, 해당공급사슬이 다수의 제품을 취급하는 일반적인 상황에 대하여 확률적인 분석모형을 설계하고, 수리적인 최적화과정을 거쳐서 다음과 같은 사실들을 규명하였다. 업체들은 자신의 이익최대화를 위해 먼저 전체공급사슬이 달성하는 이익을 최대화하여야 하는데, 이를 위해 상황에 따라 배타적으로 사용가능한 두 종류의 최적변동수수료율이 존재한다. 이 최적변동수수료율들은 온라인 쇼핑 웹사이트와 공급업체들이 각각 지출하는 한계비용들의 가중평균을 비율화한 값이며, 이 때 해당 한계비용들의 지출이 상대적으로 큰 주체가 주도적으로 제품가격을 결정하도록 하는 것이 합리적이다. 따라서 온라인 쇼핑 웹사이트의 한계비용이 공급업체들의 한계비용보다 작은 것이 일반적이라면 공급업체들이 가격결정을 주도하여야 한다. 또한 각 업체들의 실질적인 이익구현은 전체공급사슬의 이익최대화를 일차적으로 달성한 후에, 이차적인 정산과정을 거치는 이부가격제(two-part tariff)를 통하여 이루어질 수 있음을 확인하였다. 그리고 온라인 쇼핑 웹사이트는 제품군을 설계할 때 제품의 종류나 유사성보다는, 한계비용들의 비율들이 유사한 제품들로 동일제품군을 구성하여야 전체공급사슬의 이익최대화에 유리하다.

Abstract

It is common that the online shopping websites usually maintain a different retail pricing scheme for products they sell from their suppliers, because the online shopping websites and their suppliers have different incentives each other for their retail pricing mechanism which is based on the seller fee schedules between them. This research figures out some important facts which are able to help in understanding the reasons for the matter and finding resolutions for such a conflict as follows.

First, all players in the supply-chain should coordinate to maximize their total profit through the whole supply-chain applying one of the two optimal referral fee schedules which are mutually exclusive each other depending on their transactional environment. Those referral fee schedules appear to be dependent on some ratios which consist of the weighted averages of each player’s marginal costs. We suggest the explicit and closed form solutions of such ratios applying the first order condition to their profit function confirming the optimality of them.

Second, we explain the reason why it is rational for a player whose marginal costs are higher than the other’s to steer the retail pricing scheme for their products to maximize the total profit through their whole supply-chain. Therefore it is reasonable for the suppliers to set their retail prices of their products if their marginal costs are higher than their online shopping website’s, which happens to be common in the real world. On the contrary, if the marginal costs of the suppliers are lower than their online shopping website’s, then the online shopping websites should determine the retail prices of the products following their own incentive scheme.

Also we confirm that one of the results by the past research with only two competing products still holds true in more generalized multiple product cases. The result insists that profit realization for each player in the supply-chain needs to adopt a two-part tariff scheme adjusting their account fee schedules to reflect their bargaining powers between them. Finally, it is possible to maximize the profit through their whole supply-chain only if the online shopping website constructs its product groups which are supposed to apply the same referral fee schedule, applying the criterion of marginal cost ratio similarity rather than its product similarity.

Keywords:

whole supply-chain, online shopping website, double marginalization, optimal retail price, referral fee, account fee, fee, marginal cost ratio, two-part tariff

키워드:

전체공급사슬, 온라인 쇼핑 웹사이트, 이중이익부과, 최적소매가격, 변동수수료, 정액수수료, 한계비용비율, 이부가격제

Acknowledgments

이 논문은 2018년도 중앙대학교 연구 장학기금 지원에 의한 것임.

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• 저자 박해철은 현재 중앙대학교 경영경제대학 경영학부의 경영과학/운영관리 분야의 교수로 재직 중이다. 연세대학교 상경대학 응용통계학과에서 경제학사를, KAIST 경영과학과에서 석사학위를 취득하였다. 이후 예일대학교에서 경영학 박사학위를 취득하였고, 이후에는 AT&T Bell Laboratories의 Department of Operations Research에서 연구위원(Member of Technical Staff)으로 근무하였다. 중앙대학교 행정부총장과 한국생산관리학회장을 역임하였고 주요 연구분야는 확률적 계량모형 및 의사결정이론 등이다.

• 저자 현지윤은 현재 중앙대학교 경영학부 학사학위와 유통관리연계전공 학위 취득 후, 동 대학교 일반대학원 경영학과 석사과정에 재학 중이다. 주요 관심 분야는 공급사슬관리, 최적가격책정, 재고관리, 유통 및 물류 네트워크 등이다.