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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 48, No. 5, pp.1397-1423
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Oct 2019
Received 08 Feb 2019 Revised 20 Aug 2019 Accepted 02 Sep 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2019.48.5.1397

한국주식시장에서 대주주간 의결권대립 및 지배권 연합형성 가능성이 기업성과에 미치는 영향: 2대 대주주와 주식유동성을 중심으로

조경식* ; 황정주**
*(주저자) 동국대학교 경주캠퍼스 경영학부 ksjoh@dongguk.ac.kr
**(교신저자) 대구대학교 금융보험학과 vectorspaces@hanmail.net
The Effect of Blockholder Contestability and Probability of Forming Coalition on Firm Performance: Focus on the Stock Liquidity and the Role of Second Blockholder in Korean Stock Market
Kyung-Shick Cho* ; Jung-Ju Hwang**
*Visiting Professor, School of Management and Economics, Dongguk University-Gyeongju, First Author
**Instructor, Department of Finance and Insurance, Daegu University, Corresponding Author

초록

본 연구는 대주주간 의결권대립과 지배권 연합형성 가능성이 기업성과에 어떻게 영향을 미치는 지를 분석하고자 한다. 또한 두 요인이 기업성과에 미치는 영향에 있어, 외국인·기관의 2대 대주주 여부와 주식유동성에 의해 영향을 받는지를 분석하고자 한다. 분석기간은 2005년부터 2017년까지이고, 한국 상장기업들을 대상으로 패널자료에 근거한 패널회귀분석을 통하여 분석한다. 분석결과 첫째, 대주주간 의결권대립이 기업성과에 긍정적인 영향을 미치고, 대주주간 지배권 연합형성 가능성이 기업성과에 부분적으로 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 둘째, 대주주간 의결권대립 및 지배권 연합형성 가능성이 기업성과에 영향을 미침에 있어 2대 대주주 존재가 상호작용하는 효과는 나타나지 않았다. 셋째, 주식유동성이 대주주간 의결권대립이 기업성과에 미치는 긍정적인 영향과 대주주간 지배권 연합형성 가능성이 기업성과에 미치는 부정적인 영향을 부분적으로 완화시키는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 분석결과는 최근 한국증권시장에서 이슈가 되고 있는 주주행동주의 혹은 출구메커니즘 관점에서, 대주주간 의결권대립 및 지배권 연합형성 가능성과 기업성과 사이의 관련성을 이해하는데 공헌점이 있다.

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigates how the contestability or the probability of forming a controlling coalition among multiple blockholders affect firm performance. We also examine the interactions role of the second blockholders who are a foreign/institutional investor and stock liquidity in effects of blockholders contestability or the probability of forming a controlling coalition among multiple blockholders on firm performance. The analysis period is from 2005 to 2017, and it is analyzed through panel regression analysis based on the panel data for Korean listed companies.

The results provide three evidence. First, this study shows that blockholders contestability have a positive effect on firm performance, while the probability of forming a controlling coalition among multiple blockholders have a partially negative impact on firm performance. Second, there is no evidence that second blockholder presence interacts with between the contestability or the probability of forming a controlling coalition of multiple blockholders influence and company performance. Third, we find that the effects of blockholders contestability or the probability of forming a controlling coalition on firm performance decrease with higher stock liquidity.

The results of this study have contributed to the understanding of the relation between the contestability or the probability of forming a controlling coalition among multiple blockholders and firm performance in view of shareholder activism or exit mechanism, which is a recent issue in the Korean stock market.

Keywords:

blockholders contestability, the probability of forming a controlling coalition, firm performance, second blockholder, stock liquidity

키워드:

의결권대립, 지배권 연합형성 가능성, 기업성과, 2대 대주주, 주식유동성

Acknowledgments

이 논문은 2017년 대한민국 교육부와 한국연구재단의 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임(NRF-2017S1A5B5A07064065)This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF-2017S1A5B5A07064065).

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• 저자 조경식은 현재 동국대학교 경주캠퍼스 경영학부 강의초빙교수로 재직 중이다. 중앙대학교 대학원에서 경영학석사. 대구대학교 대학원에서 경영학박사를 취득하였다. 주요 연구 분야는 M&A, 소유구조/지배구조, 주식유동성에 관심을 갖고 연구를 수행하고 있다.

• 저자 황정주는 현재 대구대학교 금융보험학부 강사로 재직 중이다. 대구대학교 대학원에서 이학석사와 이학박사를 취득하였다. 주요 연구 분야는 보험수리, 통계분석, 작용소론에 관심을 갖고 연구를 수행하고 있다.