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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 48, No. 5, pp.1331-1362
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 31 Oct 2019
Received 30 Jul 2019 Accepted 26 Aug 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2019.48.5.1331

젊은 CEO가 기업혁신을 주도하는가?

임정대*
*(단독저자) 경북대학교 경영학부 BK21플러스 박사후연구원 jdyim@knu.ac.kr
Do Younger CEOs Drive Firm Innovation?
Jeongdae Yim*
*BK21 PLUS, School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University, First Author

초록

본 연구는 CEO(chief executive officer)의 연령과 기업혁신 간 관계를 분석함으로써, 젊은 CEO가 기업혁신을 이끌어내는지 그리고 이를 위한 CEO의 유인은 무엇인지를 살펴본다. 즉, CEO의 커리어 고민(career concern)에 대한 두 가설, 즉 시장 학습 가설(market learning hypothesis)과 경영자 신호 가설(managerial signaling hypothesis) 중 어느 가설이 한국 상장기업에게 적합한가를 탐색함으로써, 본 연구는 혁신 관련 문헌들에 대한 추가적 증거를 제시하는 데 기여할 것이다.

실증분석결과는 다음과 같다. 2000년부터 2016년 동안 유가증권시장과 코스닥에 상장된 제조 기업들을 대상으로, 본 연구는 CEO의 연령이 낮을수록 특허출원건수로 측정된 기업혁신에 긍정적 영향을 미친다는 것을 발견하였다. 특히 CEO 연령을 50세 미만, 50세부터 59세, 60세 이상과 같이 세 개의 범주로 구분하여, 50세 미만의 CEO들이 60세 이상의 CEO들보다 기업혁신에 더 적극적으로 참여한다는 결론을 얻었다. 이 결과는 특허출원건수가 비음이면서 가산 변수라는 특징을 갖는다는 점을 고려한 토빗(Tobit), 포아송(Poisson), 음이항(negative binomial) 모형에서도, 성향점수매칭(propensity score matching)으로 표본을 재선정하여 CEO의 연령대별 기업특성의 차이를 고려하여도, 그리고 관측할 수 없는 기업특성과 CEO특성을 고려하기 위한 기업 고정효과 및 CEO 고정효과 모형에서도 동일한 것으로 관찰되었다. 이는 한국 상장기업에서 커리어 고민(career concern)을 갖는 젊은 CEO에 대해 경영자 신호 가설(managerial signaling hypothesis)이 부합되는 결과이다. 즉, 특허출원과 같은 성공적 혁신을 통해 자신의 능력을 드러내어, 혁신 성과가 좋은 CEO 또는 특허를 잘 출원하는 CEO라는 평판을 얻기 위한 유인이 나이가 많은 CEO보다 젊은 CEO에게 더 크게 나타나기 때문으로 추론된다. 추가로 본 연구는 재임기간이 짧을수록, 즉 남은 커리어 기간이 긴 젊은 CEO가 기업혁신에 보다 적극적으로 참여한다는 것을, 그리고 젊은 CEO가 과신(overconfidence)으로 인해 기업혁신에 참여한 것이 아님을 밝힘으로써 경영자 신호 가설이 부합하는 데 대한 정당성을 확보하였다. 끝으로, 전체 표본기업을 기업이 속한 산업의 기술 수준에 따라 고 기술 기업과 저 기술 기업으로, 대규모기업집단 소속 여부에 따라 재벌 기업과 비재벌 기업으로 구분하여 살펴보았으며, 각 하위표본에 대해 CEO 연령이 미치는 영향에서 차이가 나타나나 모든 하위표본들에 대해서 젊은 CEO가 기업혁신에 대한 유인을 더 크게 갖는다는 결과를 도출하였다.

Abstract

By investigating the relationship between CEO age and firm innovation, this paper explores whether younger CEOs drive innovation and what propels them to innovate. In terms of which CEOs have incentives to actively participate in innovation, the personal characteristics of CEOs are not adequately addressed. Therefore, this paper contributes to providing further evidence of the literature on corporate innovation, by checking which of two hypotheses, market learning hypothesis or managerial signaling hypothesis, about younger CEO’s career concerns is suitable for Korean listed firms.

The empirical results are as follows. For manufacturing firms listed on two Korean stock markets from 2000 to 2016, this paper finds that CEO age has a negative effect on firm innovation measured by the number of patent applications. Generating three cohorts of CEOs by age: under 50, between 50 and 59, and 60 and above, this paper also shows that younger CEOs under 50 are more likely to take part in firm innovation than older CEOs over 60. These findings remain robust in estimating Tobit, Poisson, and negative binomial models considering the fact that the number of patent applications has the non-negative nature and the non-trivial portions of sample firms with zeros, in using samples reconstructed from the methods of propensity score matching, and in conducting firm- and CEO-fixed effect models controlling for unobservable firms’ or CEOs’ characteristics. These findings indicate that managerial signaling hypothesis is supported for younger CEOs in Korean firms. A possible explanation is that younger CEOs with career concerns have more incentives to gain reputations as great inventors or innovators and then to enjoy the benefits from these reputations in their longer career horizons, by signaling CEOs’ abilities through successful innovation, such as patents, than older CEOs do. In addition, this paper also finds that shorter-tenured younger CEOs (that is, younger CEOs with longer career horizons) more actively engage in firm innovation than longer-tenured younger CEOs (that is, younger CEOs with shorter career horizons). This additional test also indicates that younger CEOs in Korean firms want to delight in the benefits from reputations acquired from labor markets as innovators during their career horizons. This paper reconfirms that the predictions in managerial signaling hypothesis are consistent with younger CEOs in Korean firms, by providing evidence that they do not participate in firm innovation due to their overconfidence. Finally, this paper divides the sample firms into high- and low- technology firms based on technological levels of industries to which the firms belong, and into Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms following up the classification of the Korea Fair Trade Commissions. For all subsamples, the findings in this paper also appear, while there are statistical differences in the effects of CEO age on firm innovation.

From the findings, younger CEOs also have incentives to participate in firm innovation that requires long-term efforts, is more likely to fail, and has uncertain results. This paper provides implications that providing incentives to help younger CEOs manage their careers, such as reputation or ability is important to drive firm innovation.

Keywords:

CEO Age, Firm Innovation, Patent Application, Career Concern, Managerial Signaling Hypothesis

키워드:

CEO 연령, 기업혁신, 특허출원건수, 커리어 고민, 경영자 신호 가설

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• 저자 임정대는 현재 경북대학교 경영학부 BK21플러스 소속의 박사후연구원이다. 경북대학교 경영학부를 졸업하였으며, 동 대학원에서 경영학석사 및 경영학박사 학위를 취득하였다. 주요 연구 분야는 기업혁신, 보상격차, 현금보유, 신용등급 등이다.