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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 48, No. 3, pp.853-876
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Jun 2019
Received 28 Dec 2018 Revised 27 Mar 2019 Accepted 17 Apr 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2019.48.3.853

복수의 공급업체가 경쟁하고 소매업체가 매출대행을 하는 공급사슬의 거래모형

박해철* ; 안봉현**
*(주저자/교신저자) 중앙대학교 경영학부 교수 hpark@cau.ac.kr
**(공동저자) 중앙대학교 경영학부 강사 bonghyun.ahn@gmail.com
An Optimal Transaction Model of a Supply-Chain with Two Competing Suppliers in which a Retailer Does a Role of Mediator
Haechurl Park* ; Bonghyun Ahn**
*School of Business Administration, Chung-Ang University, First Author/Corresponding Author
**School of Business Administration, Chung-Ang University, Co-Author

초록

서로 대체가 가능한 제품을 생산하면서 경쟁관계에 있는 복수의 공급업체와 이들 제품의 소매매출을 중개하는 하나의 소매업체로 이루어지는 공급사슬의 최적거래모형을 분석하였다. 각 공급업체와 소매업체는 일정기간의 소매매출에 대하여 사전에 약정된 분배비율로 매출수입을 나누어 가지게 된다. 이 때 각 업체들이 거래에 참여하고자 하는 유인을 유발하면서 전체공급사슬이 달성하는 이익을 최대화하는 최적소매가격은 매출수입에 대하여 각 업체가 가져가는 분배비율의 함수가 된다. 이 분배비율의 값을 결정함에 있어서 소매업체와 개별공급업체의 입장이 서로 다르고, 선택 가능한 대안은 각 업체의 유인에 부합하는 두 가지 밖에 없으며 다른 대안을 찾고자 하는 노력은 의미가 없음을 밝혀내었다. 그리고 두 가지 대안 중의 하나를 선택하여 공급사슬전체의 이익을 최대화하여도, 개별업체의 수익성보장을 위해서는 분배비율의 합리적 결정에 더하여 고정지급금과 같은 이차적인 수입정산과정을 병행하는 이부가격제(two-part tariff)를 채용하는 매출수입배분정책을 설계하여야함을 규명하였다.

Abstract

We analyze a supply-chain consists of two competing suppliers and one retailer whose role is mediating retail sale process for the suppliers such as Online-Shopping Malls or Home Shopping Networks. Two suppliers produce similar goods which are substitutional each other, and they are supposed to pay a certain portion of their sales revenue to the retailer depending on corresponding retail sales performance. In this case, the portions of sales revenue for each player in the supply-chain play a crucial role in determining the retail prices which need to be optimized to maximize the profit through the whole supply-chain. Since each player in the supply-chain has its own incentive scheme for setting its retail price as well, the level of portions of the sales revenue for the players should be decided considering those two factors simultaneously: maximizing the profit through the whole supply-chain and satisfying incentive compatibility to each player.

We found that the incentive compatible scheme for the suppliers is completely different from retailer’s and they share no common ground at all except some particular situations. Therefore there is no possibility to devise any intermediate solutions between suppliers and a retailer through a negotiation process in terms of settling down the proportion level for each of them. As a result we propose to design a two-part tariff scheme which requires a secondary incentive scheme which adopts a fixed fee base paying system between the suppliers and a retailer.

Keywords:

supply-chain, double marginalization, optimal retail price, proportion for sales revenue sharing, marginal cost ratio, two-part tariff

키워드:

공급사슬, 이중이익부과, 최적소매가격, 분배비율, 한계비용비율, 이부가격제

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• 저자 박해철은 현재 중앙대학교 경영경제대학 경영학부의 경영과학/운영관리 분야의 교수로 재직 중이다. 연세대학교 상경대학 응용통계학과에서 경제학사를, KAIST 경영과학과에서 석사학위를 취득하였다. 이후 미국 예일대학교에서 경영학 박사학위를 취득하였고, 이후에는 AT&T Bell Laboratories의 Department of Operations Research에서 연구위원(Member of Technical Staff)으로 근무하면서 다양한 OR이론들을 기업운영에 활용하거나 통신망의 관리에 응용하는 연구를 하였다. 한국생산관리학회장을 역임하였고 주요연구 분야는 확률적 계량모형 및 의사결정이론 등이다.

• 저자 안봉현은 중앙대학교 경영대학 경영학부를 졸업하였으며, 동 대학원 경영학과에서 경영과학/생산관리/경영정보시스템 전공으로 석사 및 박사를 취득하였다. 현재 중앙대학교에서 시간강사로 재직 중이다. 주요관심분야는 최적화, 공급사슬, 비즈니스 애널리틱스 등이다.