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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 49, No. 1, pp.1-29
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 29 Feb 2020
Received 29 Apr 2019 Revised 31 Oct 2019 Accepted 12 Nov 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2020.49.1.1

정치적 관계가 회계이익의 질과 주가붕괴 위험의 관련성에 미치는 영향: 중국 상장기업을 대상으로

Feng Panpan* ; 전성일** ; 박민경***
*(주저자) 정주경공업대학교 강사 zzuli_fpp@163.com
**(교신저자) 전남대학교 경영대학 교수 sijeon@jnu.ac.kr
***(공저자) 전남대학교 경영학부 시간강사 cake9@hanmail.net
The Effect of Political Connections on the Relationship between Stock Price Crash Risk and the Quality of Accounting Earnings: Evidence from China
Feng Panpan* ; Seong Il Jeon** ; Minkyung Park***
*Lecturer, Dept. of Business Administration, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, First Author
**Professor, Dept. of Business Administration, Chonnam National University, Corresponding Author
***Lecturer, Dept. of Business Administration, Chonnam National University , Co-Author

초록

중국 자본시장은 역사가 짧고 법률 및 제도가 완전하지 않아 정보의 비대칭 문제가 심각하고 이로 인해 주가붕괴 위험이 높은 것으로 보고되고 있다(Piotroski et al. 2015). 또한, 중국의 일반적인 기업형태는 자본주의 국가들과는 달리 국유기업과 비국유기업으로 구분될 수 있고 중앙정부의 정책 의사결정이 자본시장에 미치는 영향이 매우 크다는 특징을 가지고 있다(Boubakri and Cosset 1998). 본 연구에서는 중국 기업형태의 특수성을 고려하여 회계이익의 질과 주가붕괴 위험의 관련성을 검증하고 정치적 관계의 역할을 살펴보고자 한다.

첫째, 회계정보의 질과 주가붕괴 위험의 관련성에 대해 살펴본다. 회계정보의 불투명성은 부정적인 정보를 잘 전달하지 않으려는 경영자의 의도를 반영한 결과로 투명성이 낮을수록 주가붕괴 위험이 높게 나타날 것으로 예상할 수 있다. 두 번째로, 중국 기업소유구조와 경영자의 정치적 성향이 주가붕괴 위험과 회계정보의 질의 관련성에 영향을 미치는지에 대해서 분석한다. 정치적 관계가 높은 기업은 보다 많은 재무적 특혜 및 정부의 지원이 주어지기 때문에 부정적인 정보를 숨길 유인이 적을 수 있지만 정치적 관계는 기업의 투명성이나 보수주의의 훼손으로 미래 주가붕괴 위험을 높일 수 있다.

이를 위해 2007년부터 2016년까지 중국거래소(상하이, 선전)에 상장되어 있는 금융업에 속하지 않은 기업을 대상으로 분석하였다. 분석 결과 첫째, 회계이익의 질에 대한 측정치로 사용한 재량적 발생액과 주가붕괴 위험 간 유의한 정(+)의 관련성을 보였다. 이는 회계정보의 질이 낮은 기업일수록 주가붕괴 위험이 높다는 것을 의미한다. 둘째, 기업소유구조에 따른 회계정보의 질과 주가붕괴 위험의 관계를 분석한 결과, 국유기업의 재량적 발생액과 주가붕괴 위험은 유의한 부(-)의 관련성을 보였으나 일부 모형에서만 유의성이 나타나 일반화하기에는 한계가 있다. 셋째, 경영자의 정치적 성향을 나타내는 당원여부는 주가붕괴 위험과 회계이익의 질의 관계에 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 경영자가 당원인 기업의 회계이익의 질에 따른 주가붕괴 위험이 상대적으로 높은 것으로 평가할 수 있다.

본 연구는 선행연구와 달리 회계이익의 질과 주가붕괴 위험의 관련성에 정치적 관계를 결합한 연구라는 점에서 차별성이 존재한다. 중국의 많은 기업들이 국내 및 외국 자본시장에 상장되어 있고 국내 다수의 투자자들이 중국 상장기업에 투자하는 상황에서 다국적 투자자들 및 규제기관에 정치적 관계에 대한 유용한 정보를 제공할 것으로 기대한다.

Abstract

This study is to examine the relation between stock price crash risk and the quality of accounting information and whether the political connections have an impact on that relation in Chinese capital market. China offers a good opportunity to investigate the effect of political connections to stock price crash risk due to China’s unique governance of its state-owned firms and the impact of the central government's policy on the capital market is very big. Politically connected firms may have less incentive to hide negative information because they are given more financial support by the government, but political connection can increase the stock price crash risk due to concerns on career of managers or government’s supervision,

Using 11,076 Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2007-2016, our findings are follows. First, we find that the lower the quality of accounting information, the higher the risk of stock price crash. Second discretionary accruals of state-owned firms showed a lower risk of stock crash than non-state-owned firms but, this result is partial. Third, the Communist Party Managers affect the relation between stock price crash risk and discretionary accruals negatively. This indicates that Communist Party Managers increase the stock price crash risk following to earnings management.

This study is the first attempt to examine the effect of the political connection to the relation between the quality of accounting information and stock price crash risk and we expect to provide useful information on CEO’s political relation to multi-national investors and regulators.

Keywords:

Stock price crash risk, Quality of accounting earnings, Political Connections, State-owned firms, Communist Party Manager

키워드:

이익의 질, 주가붕괴 위험, 기업소유구조, 경영자의 정치적 성향

Acknowledgments

본 연구는 주저자의 박사학위논문을 수정, 보완하였습니다.

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• 저자 풍반반은 현재 중국 정주경공업대학교 경영학부 강사로 재직 중이다. 전남대학교 경영학부를 졸업했으며 동 대학교에서 경영학석사 및 박사를 취득하였다. 주요연구분야는 기업지배구조, 재무보고의 질, 주가급락 위험 등이다.

• 저자 전성일은 경희대학교에서 재무회계 전공으로 박사학위를 취득하고 현재 전남대학교 경영대학 교수로 재직중이다. 주요연구분야는 유․무형자산의 가치평가와 주가붕괴위험 등이며, 저서로는 IFRS 중급회계 스터디가이드, SAS를 통한 회계학연구 방법론의 이해와 활용 등이 있다.

• 저자 박민경은 현재 전남대학교 경영학부 시간강사로 재직 중이다. 전남대학교 경영학부를 졸업하였으며 동 대학교에서 경영학석사 및 박사를 취득하였다. 주요연구분야는 기업지배구조, 재무보고의 질, 주가급락 위험 등이다.