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Korean Academic Society of Business Administration
[ Article ]
korean management review - Vol. 49, No. 3, pp.739-763
ISSN: 1226-1874 (Print)
Print publication date 30 Jun 2020
Received 27 Dec 2019 Revised 02 Mar 2020 Accepted 31 Mar 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2020.49.3.739

영업점 관리자 교체와 예산 톱니현상

이상철* ; 노영래** ; 이윤근***
*(주저자) 동국대학교-서울 sclee68@dongguk.edu
**(교신저자) 동국대학교-서울 smileryn@gmail.com
***(공동저자) 동국대학교-서울 yunkeun69@gmail.com
Branch Manager Turnover and Target Ratcheting
Sang Cheol Lee* ; Young Nae Roh** ; Yunkeun Lee***
*Professor, College of Business Administration, Dongguk University-Seoul, First Author
**Ph.D. Student, The Graduate School of Dongguk University-Seoul, Corresponding Author
***Adjunct Professor, College of Business Administration, Dongguk University-Seoul, Co-Author

초록

본 연구에서는 영업점 관리자의 교체 직전연도에 예산 톱니현상이 증가하는지를 분석하였다. 그리고 영업점 관리자의 교체 직전연도에 톱니현상이 증가하는 정도가 성별 및 근무경력과 같은 영업점 관리자의 특성에 따라 차이가 있는지 검증하였다. 2015년에서 2018년까지 국내 한 금융투자회사의 영업점을 표본으로 선정하여 회귀분석방법으로 검증을 실시한 결과, 다음과 같은 결과를 얻었다. 당기의 성과와 목표 차이가 차기와 당기의 목표 차이에 유의적인 양의 영향을 미치는 톱니현상이 존재하는 것으로 나타났으며, 영업점이 성과목표를 달성하지 못한 경우에는 톱니현상이 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 영업점 관리자의 교체 직전연도에 톱니현상이 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 영업점 관리자가 여성인 경우 영업점 관리자의 교체 직전연도에 톱니현상이 증가하는 정도가 완화되는 반면, 영업점 관리자의 근무경력이 높아질수록 영업점 관리자의 교체 직전연도에 톱니현상이 증가하는 정도가 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 예산 톱니현상에 대한 실증연구가 많지 않은 상황에서, 본 연구는 국내 금융투자회사의 영업점 자료를 분석하여 톱니현상을 실증적으로 검증했다는 점에서 의의를 찾을 수 있다. 또한 영업점 관리자 교체와 톱니현상 사이의 관계를 분석하고, 이러한 관련성에 영향을 미치는 영업점 경영자의 특성을 파악했다는 점에서 선행연구와 차별화되는 의의가 있다.

Abstract

We empirically investigate whether target ratcheting increases before branch managers are changed. We also examine that the characteristics of branch managers such as gender and work experience affect the relationship between branch manager turnover and target ratcheting. Using 195 branch-year data of a securities company in Korea from 2015 to 2018, we perform ordinary least square regression and White-corrected regression analysis to test the research models.

We find evidence that prior-year performance relative to target has significantly positive effect on increase in current year sales target. This test result implies that target ratcheting exists. We also find that the association between target change and performance is higher when previous performance falls short of target. These test results imply that the target ratcheting exists as well as the asymmetric pattern of target ratcheting occurs. In addition, we present evidence that the association between target changes and performance is significantly higher before branch managers are changed. Moreover, the effect of branch manager turnover on the association between target changes and performance is weaken when the branch manager is female. However, the effect of branch manager turnover on the relationship between target changes and performance is strengthen when the work experience of branch manager increases.

These test results provide the new empirical evidence on the effect of manager turnover on target ratcheting. Furthermore, these test results present the characteristics of branch managers such as gender and work experience affecting the association between branch manager turnover and target ratcheting. Therefore, this study can not only provide new determinant of target ratcheting, but also present the moderating variables affecting the association between branch manager turnover and target ratcheting. Moreover, the study helps practitioners to understand the characteristics that affect the goal setting and to develop control mechanism in budgeting process.

Keywords:

manager turnover, ratcheting, gender, tenure

키워드:

관리자 교체, 톱니현상, 성별, 근무경력

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• 저자 이상철은 현재 동국대학교-서울 경영대학 회계학과 교수로 재직 중이다. 한국투자금융지주와 한국투자증권의 사외이사로 활동한 바 있으며, 현재 삼정KPMG Professor와 한국기업지배구조원 연구교수를 역임하고 있다. 연세대학교 경영학과를 졸업하고, 연세대학교 대학원에서 경영학석사 및 박사를 취득하였다. 주요 연구분야는 기업지배구조, 예산, 성과평가 및 경영자보상 등이다.

• 저자 노영래는 한국은행에서 예산, 감사 및 지급결제업무 등을 담당하였으며, 현재 한국은행 강남본부장으로 재직 중이다. 성균관대학교 경상대학 및 대학원 회계학과를 졸업하였으며, 동국대학교 대학원 회계학과 박사과정을 수료하였다.

• 저자 이윤근은 현재 한국씨티은행 부장으로 재직 중이며, 동국대학교 회계학과 겸임교수를 맡고 있다. 연세대학교 응용통계학과를 졸업하였으며, 한국과학기술원 경영대학원에서 금융공학 석사, 동국대학교에서 경영학박사를 취득하였다. 주요 연구분야는 기업지배구조, 성과평가 및 경영자보상 등이다.